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Empirical studies show that ownership structures that separate control and cash flow 
rights create agency problems and are associated with reduced value for minority shareholders. 
Institutional investors recognize these inefficiencies and expect a discount on the share price of 
companies with control-enhancing mechanisms like multiple voting rights shares or pyramidal 
ownership structures.  
In the US, corporate pyramids are discouraged through the taxation of intercompany 
dividends, whereas multiple voting rights shares are allowed but have to be issued before the 
firm g o e s  p u b l i c .  Therefore  controlling  shareholders, w h o  w a n t  to  entrench  themselves  in 
control  by  retaining  multiple  voting  rights  shares,  pay  the  costs  of  this  inefficient  capital 
structure when the firm initially goes public at a discounted price. 
Some European countries – including Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece – have adopted a 
diametrically opposite solution. Multiple voting rights shares are expressly prohibited by the 
legislator, but corporate pyramids are commonly used by listed companies and can be created 
following  the  IPO o f  t h e  f i r m  w i t h o u t  approval  from  the s h a r e h olders.  In  this  situation, i f  
institutional investors expect that a pyramidal ownership structure will be created in the future, 
they will discount the price of the shares when the firm goes public. Therefore, if Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece are willing to privatize some of their states-owned companies and want to 
maximize the price of their stocks, they should create the conditions to assure the market that 
these companies will not be controlled through pyramids in the future.  
Because  of  strong  opposition  from n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  e l i t e s ,  w h o  c o n t r o l  t he  largest 
corporate groups, it is very difficult to adopt strict regulations aimed at prohibiting – or at least 
limiting – the use of pyramidal ownership structures in a relatively short period of time. In order 
to  solve  this  Olson  problem  I  suggest  that  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece  should  use 
regulatory  dualism  to  create  new  markets  with  enhanced  corporate  governance  rules  that 
prevent shareholders’ control through pyramids. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to economic theory an efficient corporate governance structure – one that 
effectively protects outside investors – maximizes the value of the shares listed in a public 
market. 
1 This assumption leads rational owners of companies to adopt measures aimed at 
protecting  outside  investors  before  selling  their  shares  in  a  public  offering.  When  a 
government sells shares in order to privatize a state-owned firm, it can maximize the price by 
adopting  a  capital-market  regulation t h a t  o p t i m i z e s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f f e r e d  t o  m i n o r i t y  
investors. 
As  some  legal  scholars  have  pointed  out,
  2 t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c o r p o r ate 
governance arrangements depends substantially on the ownership structure of the firms. In 
continental Europe, where most listed companies are controlled, the most important feature 
of corporate governance is the protection of minority shareholders from the extraction of 
private benefits by the main stockholder. 
The problem of private benefit of control extraction is particularly severe in situations 
where the voting rights of the controlling shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights. This 
divergence exacerbates the conflicts of interests inherent in the agency relationship between 
                                                 
* I am very grateful for the helpful comments and suggestion of Professors Luca Enriques, Reiner Kraakman 
and Mark J. Roe; the participants to the seminar on Empirical Studies on Corporate Governance (Harvard Law School, 
spring 2013); and Kobi Kastiel. 
1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Investor protection and 
corporate valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002). 
2 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1269 (2009). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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managers and controlling shareholders, on the one hand, and minority shareholders, on the 
other hand.  
The separation between voting rights and financial exposure by a controller can be 
achieved through different types of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms (“CEMs”). The most 
common among these mechanisms are the adoption of pyramidal ownership structures and 
the issuance of multiple voting rights shares. Both ownership structures effectively separate 
the ultimate economic risk and the voting rights of the controller. However different legal 
systems have adopted diverse solutions in regulating these two types of CEMs. 
In the US, corporate pyramids are legally discouraged, whereas multiple voting-right 
shares are allowed and have been adopted by prominent public companies such as Ford, 
3 
Google, 
4 F a c e b o o k  
5 a n d  B e r k s h i r e  H a t h a w a y .  
6 S o m e  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (“GIPS”), have adopted a seemingly opposite solution by 
prohibiting multiple voting-rights shares, but allowing listed companies to build corporate 
pyramids.  Other  countries  are  even  more  open  – o r  c l o s e d  – t o  t h e  u s e  o f  C E M s  b y  
controlling shareholders. In Sweden, for example, some of the richest families of the country 
use a combination of multiple voting rights shares and pyramidal ownership structures to 
control an extended and diversified group of companies. Israel follows yet another approach. 
After  banning t h e  u s e  o f  multiple  voting  rights  shares,  the  legislator  now  proposes  to 
discourage the creation of new corporate pyramids and to dismantle the current ones. 
                                                 
3 See: Ford Motor Company, Notice of 2012 Annual Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement, available 
at: http://corporate.ford.com/doc/2012_proxy.pdf.  
4 G o o g l e  I n c . ,  N o t i c e  o f  2 0 1 2  A n n u a l  M e e t i n g  o f  Stockholders,  available  at: 
http://investor.google.com/pdf/2012_google_proxy_statement.pdf.  
5 F a c e b o o k  I n c . ,  2 0 1 2  F o r m  1 0 -K,  available  at:  http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1326801-13-
3&CIK=1326801.  
6 Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2012 Form 10-K, available at: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2011ar/201110-
K.pdf.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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3 
In this paper I first highlight the potential agency problems created by the separation 
between controllers’ voting rights and cash flow rights. Then I compare the costs and benefits 
of prohibiting multiple voting rights shares and/or corporate pyramids. In the last part of the 
paper I look at solutions to reduce the separation of controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
and cash flow rights by preventing the creation of corporate pyramids. In particular, I propose 
a solution for countries like the GIPS that are considering privatizing some of their state 
owned companies and want to maximize the price of their stocks. 
Empirical data shows that, at least in developed economies, investors expect a discount 
on  the  share p r i c e  o f  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  C E M s .  
7  If  the  market  anticipates  the c r e a t i o n  o f  
corporate  pyramids f o l l o w i n g  t h e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  owned  companies,  investors  will 
discount the price paid for these stocks at the beginning. Therefore, in order to increase the 
price of the stocks to be sold in the market, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain should adopt 
rules aimed at preventing the future adoption of CEMs and, in particular, the creation of 
pyramidal ownership structures that create substantial agency problems. 
As the very recent Israeli initiative on pyramidal ownership structures shows, since 
current controlling shareholders of groups of companies are very powerful opponents of any 
regulations aimed at prohibiting the use of pyramids, it is very difficult for any government to 
approve a strict reform in a reasonable time-period. In order to deal with this Olson problem I 
suggest that GIPS take as their model the Brazilian "Novo Mercado", where “regulatory 
dualism” has allowed the creation of a new market with enhanced corporate governance rules 
adopted by the listing standards. In privatizing state-owned companies GIPS should create a 
                                                 
7 See Section III.C. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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new market with specific rules aimed at preventing the separation of shareholders’ voting 
rights and cash flow rights. This new market should also be available for the IPO of other 
private companies willing to comply with its listing rules. 
 
I. AGENCY COSTS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF SEPARATING CONTROL FROM CASH-FLOW 
RIGHTS 
A. Agency Costs of CEMs 
The use of CEMs allows controlling shareholders to hold voting rights disproportionate 
to their cash flow rights. The separation between the controlling rights and the economic 
investment affects the agency relationship between controlling shareholders/managers and 
minority investors in two different but related ways. First, this separation misaligns insiders’ 
interests  from  the  maximization  of  the  overall  shareholders’  value  in  taking  some  key 
management decisions. Second, the use of CEMs may allows insiders to retain enough voting 
power  to  prevent  the  threat  of  proxy  contests  or  hostile  takeovers  which a r e  t h e  m o s t  
powerful mechanisms to limit agency costs in diffused ownership structures.  
 
1. Shareholders’ Interests Misalignment  
Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Reiner Kraakman and George Triantis have identified the 
agency costs associated with CEMs mainly “in three important contexts: choosing investment The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
 
 
 
5 
projects, selecting investment policy and the scope  of  the  firm,  and  choosing  to  transfer 
control.” 
8 
The first type of interests’ misalignment is illustrated by the case of a firm with two 
different projects, one of which is more valuable for the company than the other. In this 
scenario, the insider could force the firm to choose the sub-optimal project, if it provides the 
insider with enough private benefits to offset the portion of the economic loss attributed to 
his (low) cash flow rights. 
9 
A second type of interests’ misalignment is produced because CEMs create a strong 
incentive to retain cash resources within the firm rather than share this money with minority 
shareholders. This creates a tendency to over-invest and expand the firm, even when there are 
only economically poor projects to pursue. 
10 
The  third  type  considers  the  controlling  shareholders’  incentives  to  sell  their 
controlling bloc of shares to a new investor. Control transactions could be governed by two 
different legal regimes: the “market rule” which is followed in many countries – including 
the United States – and the “equal opportunity rule”, that is endorsed among others by the 
European Union. 
11 Under the “market rule” the main shareholder can sell its controlling 
participation at the highest possible price without sharing the controlling premium paid by 
the acquirer with the minority shareholders. A different approach is followed by the “equal 
                                                 
8 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class 
equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 295, 301 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
9 Id. at 301-2. 
10 Id. at 302-3; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Agency 
Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000). 
11 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q. J. ECON. 957 (1994). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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opportunity rule”, which grants all shareholders the right to sell their shares at the same price 
offered to the controller. 
In  situations  where  the  “equal  opportunity  rule”  applies  – e i t h e r  a s  a  s t a t u t o r y  
provision, or as a contractual arrangement inserted in the corporate charter of companies 
otherwise subject to the “market rule” 
12 – the controlling shareholder will have the incentive 
to reject some value enhancing control transactions. This is because they would be the only 
ones who lose their private benefits, as most of the efficiency gains would go to the other 
shareholders, who would receive a portion of the controlling premium paid by the acquirer 
proportionate to their cash-flow rights. 
 
2. Reducing Constraints on Agency Costs 
In companies with a dispersed ownership, bad managers who are not capable or willing 
to maximize shareholders’ value can be replaced by the stockholders or outside investors. 
Managerial slack can convince otherwise passive equity investors to take action and start a 
proxy fight in the annual meeting to replace some or all the companies’ directors. 
Even if the current shareholders remain inactive, the market will sanction a firm’s poor 
performances  by  reducing  the  price  of  the  shares.  This r e d u c t i o n ,  in  turn,  can  provide 
opportunities for activist investors, such as hedge funds, to launch a hostile takeover or to 
buy a relevant participation in the target firm and start a confrontational discussion with poor 
                                                 
12 See: In Re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012). The 
litigation arised in a merger context in which the controller of the company tried to negotiate for a higher price for his 
Class B stock despite a Charter’s provision which endorsed a sort of “equal opportunity rule” by prescribing that: 
[I]n the case of any distribution or payment… on Class A Common Stock or Class B Common Stock 
upon the consolidation or merger of the Corporation with or into any corporation… such distribution 
payment shall be made ratably on a per share basis among the holders of the Class A Common Stock 
and Class B Common Stock as a single class. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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managers,  or  even  challenge  them  in  the  annual  meetings. T hese  corporate  governance 
mechanisms  are  ineffective,  however, w h e n  m a n a g e m e n t  holds  enough  voting  power  to 
insulate  it  from p r o x y  f i g h t s  or  a  hostile  takeover.  The  use  of  CEMs  allows 
managers/controlling shareholders to entrench themselves, without investing an amount of 
money proportionate to their voting rights. 
13 Therefore, in companies with CEMs, minority 
shareholders must rely on other constraints of agency costs such as legal enforcement - where 
managers breach their fiduciary duties - or reputational costs for the controlling shareholders 
who grossly misbehave.
 14 
 
B. Potential Benefits of CEMs 
1. Controlling Shareholders Monitoring the Management 
Some scholars have also identified potential benefits associated with the adoption of 
CEMs. 
15 
Market based mechanisms, such as the threat of a hostile takeover or a proxy fight 
initiated by activists investors, require a significant drop in the market price of shares in order 
to operate. Therefore, such mechanisms intervene only when managerial slack is so pervasive 
                                                 
13 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, supra note 8, at 301 (“Unlike in [dispersed 
ownership] structures, where controlling management may have little equity but can be displaced, the controllers of… 
companies [adopting CEMs] face neither proxy contests nor hostile takeovers”). 
14 Id. at 305: 
The  fact  that  CMS  structures  [i.e.  controlling-minority  structures  or  CEMs]  can  impose  significant 
agency costs is well known, even if the magnitude of these costs is not. It follows that CMS controllers 
who return to the equity market must pay a price for the expected agency cost of CMS structures unless 
they can establish a reputation for sound management.  
See also: Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational 
Exchanges, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 648 (2007). 
15 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms 
versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 J. INST. THEOR. ECON. 160 (2013). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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that the potential benefits created by a different board exceed the costs associated with a 
takeover bid or a proxy fight. 
Having  a  controlling  shareholder, w h o  h a s  a  d e e p  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
business and the economic incentives to monitor managers’ performance effectively – allows 
a more effective and timely control over the management than is possible with dispersed 
ownership. As Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz have argued, “[l]everaged control permits 
controlling  shareholders  to  exploit  economies  of  scale  and  scope  in  monitoring  and 
managerial talents. Leverage  also  reduces  the  extent  of  firm  specific  risk  the  controlling 
shareholder must bear and for which he otherwise would have to be compensated.” 
16 
 
2. Reducing Controlled Companies Constraints in Raising Economic Resources in the 
Equity Market  
If controlling shareholders cannot use CEMs to secure their control following an IPO 
or a secondary public offering, they could prefer to keep their firms private or issue a lower 
amount  of  shares i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  T h e se  strategies, i n  t u r n , w o u l d  r e d u c e  t h e  financial 
resources available for expanding firms’ activities and pursuing new business opportunities. 
Alternatively, t h e s e  f i r m s  w o u l d  b e  f o r c e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  i n d e b t edness,  adopting  an 
inefficient  capital  structure  that  would  br m o r e  e x p e n s i v e  a n d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r i s k i n e s s  o f  
bankruptcy. 
                                                 
16 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, supra note 15 at 162. See also, Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, 
Report  Concerning  Recommendations  of  the  Committee  on  Enhancing  Competitiveness,  7-8  (December  1,  2011), 
available at: http://mof.gov.il/Lists/CompetitivenessCommittee_2/Attachments/96/Gilson.pdf:  
[C]ontrolling  shareholders  are  an  effective  alternative  to  market  policing  of  the  agency  cost  of 
managerial lack of diligence and poor performance that result from the specialization of risk bearing and 
management. Pyramids, and other means of expanding the reach of a controlling shareholder’s authority, 
thus capture economies of scale associated with monitoring management’s diligence and performance.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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From  this  perspective t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  C E M s  allows a n  e f f i c i e n t  bargain  between 
insiders and outside investors in situations where controllers are not willing to allow the 
issuance of more equity that would jeopardize their control, even when this refusal would 
impair the growth and financial stability of their enterprise. 
17 
 
C. CEMs’ Effects on the Market Value of shares 
The agency problems associated with the separation between controllers’ cash flow 
rights  and  voting  rights  are  easily r e c o g n i z e d  b y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  i n v e s t o r s .  T h e s e  i n v e s t o r s  
therefore discount the price that they are willing to pay for the shares issued by companies 
thar adopt CEMs.  
According  to  a  2007  survey  involving 4 4 5  i n stitutional  investors  worldwide  that 
collectively managed more than 4.9 trillion in assets (the “ISS Report”), “80% of investors 
would expect a discount on the share price of companies with CEMs. This discount ranges 
from 10% to 30% of the share price for the majority of investors who attempted to quantify 
it.”
 18 
                                                 
17 Alessio M. Pacces, Featuring Control Power: Corporate Law and Economics Revisited, 13 (2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089406, (“Entrepreneurs concerned with idiosyncratic private benefits may only go public 
with  an  ownership  structure  that  supports  ongoing  exercise  of  corporate  control  and  its  protection  from  hostile 
takeover.”); John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporation Be?, in 
REFORMING COMPANY LAW AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 677, 690 (Guido Ferrarini et al. ed,  2004). Arguing that in 
situations  where  the  “Break-Through”  rule  applies  and  the  board  cannot  take  defensive  mesures  against  hostile 
takeovers:  
[B]oth existing or new public firms that have both a conventional one-share/one-vote structure and a 
single (or small group) of controlling shareholders may simply turn down net present value projects if 
they would require the shareholders to put their control at risk. 
18 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
Report  on  the  Proportionality  Principle  in  the  European  Union, 6  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf.   The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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This  finding  argues  strongly t h a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  c r e a t e d  b y  C E M s  a r e  n o t  
considered material by investors when compared to the agency costs caused by the same 
ownership structures. 
 
II. CONTROL ENHANCING MECHANISMS ACROSS DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Controlling shareholders can use several legal devices in order to separate their voting 
rights from their ultimate economic risk in a firm. CEMs include the issuance of non-voting 
shares  and/or  “golden  shares”,  the  use  of  depository  certificates,  cross-shareholdings  and 
shareholders agreements. However, the most effective and commonly used CEMs are the 
issuance of multiple voting rights shares and the adoption of pyramidal ownership structures. 
In this paper I will focus my analysis and policy recommendations on these two CEMs only.  
Multiple voting-rights shares provide different voting power to the owners of different 
types of stocks. For example, a company could issue A-shares with one vote per unit of par 
value and B-shares with ten votes per unit of par value. An alternative, although very similar, 
arrangement could be to provide A-shares with one vote per any 10 units of par value and B-
shares with one vote per unit of par value. Both capital structures allow the holder of a 
substantial  amount  of  B-shares  to  exercise  control  over  the  company  without  carrying  a 
proportionate economic risk. 
The same gap between voting rights and cash flow rights can also be achieved through 
the adoption of a pyramidal ownership structure. In this case the main shareholder holds a 
controlling stake in a company that in turn has a majority participation in another company, 
which controls a third company, and so on. The use of different companies – which are The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
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participated also by minority shareholders – allows the main shareholder to exercise a very 
strong, or complete, control of even very large listed companies situated at the bottom of the 
pyramidal s t r u c t u r e  w i t h o u t  i n v e s t i n g  a n  a m o u n t  o f  m o n e y  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  t o  t h e i r  v o t i n g  
power in the same firms. 
Even  though  multiple  voting  rights  shares  and  pyramidal  ownership  structures  are 
generally used to achieve the same goal – i.e. separating ownership and control – and create 
similar agency problems, 
19 different legal systems treat these two types of CEMs in radically 
different ways. The following paragraphs describe the four different kinds of regulation that 
prevail in the US, the GIPS, Sweden and Israel. 
 
A. Multiple Voting Rights Shares in the US 
Empirical studies have documented that pyramidal ownership structures are extremely 
rare in the United States. 
20 Randal Morck has provided historical evidence that corporate 
pyramids disappeared almost completely in the 1930s, when the Roosevelt administration 
                                                 
19 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Corporate Pyramids in the Israeli Economy: Problems and Policies: A Report Prepared 
for  the  Committee  on  Increasing  Competitiveness  in  the  Economy,  at  4  (March  2012),  available  at: 
http://mof.gov.il/Lists/CompetitivenessCommittee_4/Attachments/3/Opinion_2.pdf (the “Final Report”): 
Corporate pyramids are closely related to dual-class stock companies. They are both mechanisms which 
separate cash flow rights and voting rights, and which enable a party to control corporate assets while 
contributing only a minority (and sometimes a small minority) of the equity capital funding these assets. 
Indeed, in some situations, a pyramid and a dual-class stock structure would produce an economically 
identical result.  
20 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 
J. FIN. 471, 501 (1999); Bellen Villalonga and Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, 22 REV. FIN. 
3047, 3075-6 (2009) (using as sample all the firms that were listed in the Fortune 500 in the period 1994-2000 they 
found that only eleven firms exhibit pyramidal ownership); Ronald W. Masulis, Peter Kien Pham, and Jason Zein, 
Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices, 
24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3556, 3570, Table 2 (2011) (in 2002 only 1.03 percent of all U.S. public companies were controlled 
through a pyramidal structure) The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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introduced  intercompany  dividend  taxation  that  made  these  corporate  structures  more 
burdensome for controllers than before. 
21 
The dismantling of pyramidal ownership structures in the US cannot be considered 
merely an involuntary and marginal side effect of the Federal income taxation reform: The 
legislative  history s h o w s  t h a t  “the  New  Deal  Congress  taxed  dividends  to  dismantle 
ownership structures”. 
22 
The US aversion to corporate pyramids is not driven by opposition to the separation 
between voting rights and cash flow rights. U.S. law permits separation by means of the 
issuance of multiple voting shares held by the controlling shareholder. According to a recent 
research, “ [o]verall,  dual-class  firms  comprise  about  6  percent o f  t h e  n umber  of  public 
companies and 8 percent of the market capitalization”. 
23 In the most frequent arrangement, 
common shares have only one vote per share, while the superior class of shares has ten votes 
per share. 
24 However, in some cases the gap between votes assigned to common and superior 
shareholders is much higher. For example, the Ford company’s Class B Stock held by the 
                                                 
21 Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups—The Double Taxation of Inter-Corporate 
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy, 19 TAX POL. ECON. 135 (2005); Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, 
Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, (2005); see also Randall Morck, The Riddle of 
the Great Pyramids, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS GROUPS (Asli M. Colpan & Takashi Hikino ed., 2009). 
For an alternative explanation of the rarity of corporate pyramids in the US see Steven Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, The 
Corporate Pyramid Fable, 84 BUS. HIST. REV. 435, 458 (2010) (their “research indicates that the relative rarity of 
corporate pyramids in the U.S. likely cannot be attributed to intercorporate taxation of dividends…  in the case of 
utilities, the one sector where pyramids were commonplace, regulation, namely the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935, was pivotal”).  
22 Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: A POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
107 (1994), (“It is a part of a pattern from antitrust and financial regulation that seeks fragmentation and arm’s-length 
dealing and has continuing effects today”). 
23 Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in 
the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1057 (2010).  
24 See: Bellen Villalonga and Raphael Amit, supra note 20 at 3066; Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew 
Metrick, supra note 23 at 1056 : 
On average, the insiders of dual-class firms own a majority of the voting rights (about 60%) and a 
significant minority of the cash-flow rights (about 40%). Nearly all of these voting rights come from the 
superior voting class stock: less than 15% of the insiders’ voting rights come from the inferior voting 
class.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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Ford family has 40 percent of the general voting power. In the 2012 shareholders’ meeting 
this arrangement had the effect that each of the 70,852,076 outstanding shares of Class B 
Stock was entitled to 35,238 votes.
 25 
 
B. Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
GIPS  have  adopted  a  completely  different  approach  towards  CEMs.  All  of  these 
countries generally endorse the “one share-one vote” principle 
26 and prohibit multiple voting 
rights shares. 
27 Paradoxically, however, these legal systems also permit the creation of large 
pyramidal  ownership  structures,  which  allow  the  creation  of  substantial  gaps  between 
controllers’ voting rights and economic exposure. 
In Italy, the reforms in corporate law introduced in the last fifteen years to strengthen 
minority investors’ protection have been coupled with a significant reduction in the use of 
pyramidal ownership structures by controlling shareholders. 
28 However, corporate pyramids 
                                                 
25 See Ford Motor Company, supra note 3 at 2.  
26 The “one share-one vote” principle is note absolute and without exceptions in these countries. In Italy and in 
Spain, for example, multiple voting rights shares are expressly prohibited, but, on the other hand, companies are 
allowed to issue non-voting shares having a par value up to half of their nominal share’s capital. See: Article 2351 of 
the Italian Civil Code; Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, The ultimate ownership in western European corporations, 65 
J. FIN. ECON. 365, 386-7 (2002); Marcello Bianchi and Magda Bianco, Italian Corporate Governance in the last 15 
years:  From  Pyramids  to  Coalitions?, F i n a n c e  W orking  Paper  no.  144.  ECGI,  10-12  (2006) a v a i l a b l e  a t :  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952147, (“In 2005 only 14% of the [Italian] companies issued non 
voting shares; their value was 4% of total shares on the market.”)  
27  See  Institutional  Shareholder  Services,  Sherman  &  Sterling  and  the  European  Corporate  Governance 
Institute, supra note 18; OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, Lack of Proportionalit Between Ownership 
and  Control:  Overview  and  Issues  for  Discussion,  21  (2007),  available  at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/32/40038351.pdf; Deminor Rating, Application of the one share - one vote principle in 
Europe,  A  survey  Commissioned  by  Association  of  British  Insurers ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  http://va.issproxy.com/ 
resourcecenter/publications/European_General_Reports/ABI_DEMINOR_full%20 report.pdf.  
28 T h r e e  m a j o r  r e f o r m s  h a v e  m a i n l y  c o n t r i b u i t e d  t o  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  I t a l i a n  c o r p o r a t e  g o vernance 
regulation. The Financial Markets Consolidated Act (also called “Legge Draghi”) in 1998 has provided an extensive 
reform of listed companies’ corporate governance and disclosure requirements. The general reform of companies’ law 
(“Riforma del diritto societario”) in 2003 and the Investor Protection Act (“Legge sul Risparmio”) in 2005, wich have 
generally improved minority shareholders protections. See: Luca Enriques, Corporate governance reforms in Italy: 
what has been done and what is left to do, 10 EU. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 477 (2009); Marcello Bianchi, Magda Bianco and 
Luca Enriques, Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy, in THE CONTROL OF The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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still control many of the largest Italian listed companies. According to a very recent survey 
made by Consob (the Italian securities regulation commission), in 2012 20.3 percent of the 
Italian listed companies – representing 62.2 percent of the overall market capitalization – 
were controlled through pyramids. 
29  
Corporate pyramids are also commonly used in Spain. Mara Faccio and Larry Lang 
document that, in the 1996-1999 period, 16 percent of all Spanish companies were controlled 
through  pyramids. 
30 T h e  I S S  R e p o r t  s h o w s  t h a t  i n  2 0 0 6 , f o u r  o f  t h e  t w e n t y  l a r g e s t  
companies featured this kind of CEM. 
31 
Corporate Pyramids are also diffused in Portugal (Faccio’s and Lang’s survey reports 
that they represent 10.91 percent of the listed companies 
32) and they represent “the most 
common CEM in recently listed Greek companies”. 
33  
 
                                                                                                                                                
CORPORATE EUROPE 154, 183-4 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht ed., 2001); Guido Ferrarini, Corporate governance 
changes  in  the  20th  century:  a  view  from  Italy,  Law  Working  Paper  no.  29,  ECGI  (2005);  Francesca  Cuomo, 
Alessandro  Zattoni  &  Giovanni  Valentini,  The  Effects  of  Legal  Reforms  on  the  Ownership  Structure  of  Listed 
Companies,  IND.  CORP.  CHANGE 22 ( 2012)  ( Thei r  “r esul t s show t hat  [ i n I t al y,  i n t he 1985-2005 time period,] an 
increase in the protection of investors’ rights is associated with a decrease in the use of CEMs and in the separation 
between control and cash flow rights”). 
29 CONSOB, RAPPORTO 2012 S U L L A  CORPORATE COVERNANCE  DELLE SOCIETÀ QUOTATE ITALIANE, 7 (2012), 
available at: www.consob.it/documenti/Pubblicazioni/Rapporto_cg/rcg2012.pdf (In 1998, 38.9 % of the Italian listed 
companies – representing 78.2 % of the overall market capitalization – were controlled through pyramids). On the 
relevance of corporate pyramids in Italy see also: Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, supra 
note  20,  at  501;  Institutional  Shareholder  Services,  Sherman  &  Sterling  and  the  European  Corporate  Governance 
Institute,  supra  note  18,  at  59-61  (in  2008,  nine  of  the  twenty  largest I t a l i a n  l i s t e d  c o m p a n i e s  f e a t u r e  a  p y r a m i d  
structure); Marcello Bianchi and Magda Bianco, supra note 26 at 10-12, (Noting that, even if they have decreased in 
number and in depth, “pyramidal groups are still a relevant feature of Italian listed companies ownership structure”); 
Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, supra note 26, at 389-91. 
30 Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, supra note 26, at 389. 
31 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
supra note 18, at 71-72 (the four big listed companies controlled through pyramidal ownership structures are: Abertis 
(Industrials)  and  ACS  (Industrials),  FCC  (Industrials)  and  Gas  Natural  (Oil  &  Gas));  See  also  Rafael  La  Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, supra note 20, at 501. 
32 Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, supra note 26, at 389 
33 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
supra note 18, at 49-50 (“Pyramid structures were identified in 15% of large companies and 64% of recently listed 
companies”);  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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C.  Multiple  Voting  Rights  Shares  and  Pyramidal  Ownership  Structures  in 
Sweden 
Swedish  corporate  law  is  particularly  “friendly”  towards  the  use  of  CEMs b y  
controlling shareholders in order to separate their voting rights from their cash-flow rights. 
Corporate pyramids and multiple voting rights shares are extremely common in the Swedish 
capital market. Indeed, in “the early 1990s, the two dominant ownership groups in Sweden 
had used these instruments to control 50 percent of the market cap of the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange (SSE) based on a mere two percent of the dividend rights”. 
34 
This situation does not seem to have changed much today: recent data shows that in 
2006, 16 of the 20 largest Swedish companies issued multiple voting rights shares and 13 
members of the same group used pyramidal ownership structures. 
35 As Peter Högfeldt’s 
pointed out:  
[D]espite t h e  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  a n d  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l ,  
corporate ownership is as entrenched as ever in Sweden since the largest firms are 
still controlled by an old financial nobility of the third to fifth generation and by 
banks, but to a much lesser extent by institutions that provide the majority of the 
capital. 
36 
                                                 
34 Magnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish corporate control model: convergence, persistence or 
decline?, 20 CORP. GOV. INT. REV. 212, 213 (2012). 
35 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
supra note 18, 74-76; Clas Bergstrom & Kristian Rydqvist, Ownership of Equity in Dual Class Firms, 14 J. BANK. FIN., 
237, 260 (1990) (in Sweden “the proportion listed dual-class firms has increased from 32% in 1968 to 74% of the listed 
firms in 1986”).  
36 Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY  OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  AROUND  THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS  TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS, 517, 538 (Randall K. 
Morck, ed., 2005). But see also: Magnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson supra note 34 at 220, (Noting that even if “the 
traditional Swedish corporate control model based on “old capital” and a large wedge between control rights and cash-
flow rights… is still dominant on the SSE [i.e. the Stockholm Stock Exchange]…[in the last years] there is far less 
pyramiding and use of dual-class shares”).! The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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D.  Prohibition  of  Multiple  Voting  Rights  Shares  and  Proposed  Limitation  of 
Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Israel 
Until the 1980’s the Israeli corporate governance model had some features similar to 
those seen in the Swedish economy. Corporate pyramids and shares with different voting 
rights were both allowed and commonly used in Israeli listed companies. Shmuel Hauser and 
Beni Lauterbach report that “[a]t the end of 1989, about 40% of the firms traded on the Tel 
Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) had dual-class stocks. The superior vote stocks were always 
‘one share one vote’ stocks, while the inferior vote stocks were typically ‘five shares one 
vote’ stocks”. 
37  
Starting  from  January  1990,  however,  a  regulatory  reform  required  any  Israeli 
company seeking to raise equity for the first time on the TASE to issue only superior class 
stocks  (i.e.  one  share-one  vote  common  stocks). 
38 S i n c e  t h e n ,  d u a l  s h a r e s  h a v e  a l m o s t  
completely disappeared from the Israeli stock market. 
39 
The use of corporate pyramids was also widely spread among controlling shareholders 
before the introduction of limitations on dual-shares. 
40 Even today this CEM is extremely 
diffused in the Israeli economy. A recent survey conducted by the “Committee on Increasing 
                                                 
37 Shmuel Hauser & Beni Lauterbach, The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from 
Dual-Class Stock Unifications, 17 REV. FIN. ST. 1167, 1169 (2004). 
38 Shmuel Hauser & Beni Lauterbach, supra note 37, at 1169; Beni Lauterbach & Yishay Yafeh, Long term 
Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 215 
(2011).  
39 Beni Lauterbach & Yishay Yafeh, supra note 38, at 216: 
Following this regulatory change, by the year 2000, over 80 of the 109 dual class firms listed on the 
TASE in 1990 unified their shares. Most of the remaining dual class firms were delisted, merged or 
unified their shares in recent years, so that by the beginning of 2009 dual class stocks have become 
almost extinct. (Only seven dual class share firms still trade).  
40 Beni Lauterbach & Yishay Yafeh, supra note 38, at 227 (“Business groups, a common feature in Israel's 
economic landscape, have not been used to replace dual class shares”). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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Competitiveness in the Economy” appointed by the Prime Minister of Israel, the Minister of 
Finance,  and  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Israel  in  October  2010 ( t h e  “ C o m m i t t e e  o n  
Increasing Competitiveness”) has identified:  
24 major business groups controlling about 136 out of 596 listed companies (23%), 
and approximately 68% of total stock market capitalization. According to [a report 
prepared by the Committee on Increasing Competitiveness], the 10 largest business 
groups’ market capitalization amounts to 41.3% of total stock market capitalization. 
The biggest business group holds assets equal to approximately 19.4% of GDP; the 
five largest business groups hold assets equal to approximately 62.8% of GDP. 
41 
The Committee was inter alia “asked to recommend advisable policy measures with 
emphasis on […] the issue of the control of a public company using a pyramid holding 
structure”. 
42 As we will see in section IV.C of this paper, the Committee has proposed the 
introduction of new rules aimed at reducing pyramidal ownership structures by preventing 
the creation of new business groups in Israel, and at simplifying the structure of existing 
pyramids by limiting the permissible “layers” of companies. 
                                                 
41 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 19 at 4. See also: Konstantin Kosenko, Evolution of Business Groups in 
Israel: Their Impact at the Level of the Firm and the Economy, 5 ISRAEL ECON. REV. 55 (2007): 
Using panel data on 650 public companies from 1995 to 2006, [he] identify twenty major business 
groups controlling about 160 listed companies and close to a half of total stock market capitalization, 
while the 10 largest groups’ segment of the market capitalization is among the largest in the western 
world and amounts to 30 percent. These groups are family-controlled and highly diversified across 
different industries with common pyramidal structure of ownership: roughly 80 percent of all group-
affiliated companies belong to business pyramids.  
42 S e e :  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n c r e a s i n g  C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i n  t h e  E c o n o m y ,  p r e s s  r e l e a s e  o n  F e b r u a r y  1 8 ,  2 0 1 2 ,  
available at http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/publications/PressRelease.pdf.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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III. PYRAMIDAL OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES VS. MULTIPLE VOTING RIGHTS SHARES 
The  adoption  of  opposite  normative  solutions  to  regulate  corporate  pyramids  and 
multiple voting rights shares in different developed economies has been driven by historical 
events, political choices, dissimilar development of financial institutions and capital markets, 
and path dependence. 
43 Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the regulation in place in any of 
these  legal  systems i s  t h e  m o s t  r a t i o n a l  a n d  e f f i c i e n t ,  g i v e n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f e a t u r e s  of  the 
country’s economy and capital market development. 
For  this  reason  in  the  next  paragraphs  I  analyze  the  main  costs  and  benefits  of 
pyramidal  ownership  structures  and  multiple  voting  right  shares.  This  analysis  makes 
possible to understand whether the current regulation adopted by GIPS is the most efficient – 
and therefore would maximizes the price of their state controlled companies to be privatized 
in their stock market – or if these countries should consider other normative solutions more 
similar to the ones seen in the US or Sweden, or the one proposed in Israel.  
 
A. Costs and Benefits of Multiple Voting Rights Shares 
1. Costs of Allowing Firms’ Control Through Multiple Voting Rights Shares 
Empirical studies have documented the agency costs associated with the issuance of 
multiple voting rights shares even in countries with a developed legal system. For example, 
                                                 
43 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 
52 STAN L. REV. 127 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV.1642, 1644-5 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and 
Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 327, 332 (1996):  
the  path  dependent  characteristics  of  a  given  national  governance  system  confront  the  disciplining 
effects of the operative selection mechanisms. In the end, institutions are shaped by a form of corporate 
governance plate tectonics, in which the demands of current circumstances grind against the influence of 
initial conditions The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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using a sample of 2,440 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2003 for 503 U.S. dual-class 
companies, Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang and Fei Xie, find that: 
[A]s the insider control rights–cash flow rights divergence becomes larger, outside 
shareholders raise the discount on an extra dollar of corporate cash holdings, CEOs 
receive  greater  compensation,  and  managers  engage  in  more  inefficient  empire-
building activities such as acquisitions and large capital expenditures. These results 
are consistent with larger excess control rights leading to both greater private benefits 
of control and reduced market value to outside shareholders. 
44 
 
2. Costs of prohibiting Multiple Voting-Rights Shares. 
Given the agency problems created by multiple voting rights shares, it might seem 
surprising that some of the most successful U.S. firms like Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, 
GroupOn and Zynga have adopted this corporate governance structure in their recent IPOs. 
This choice might seem even more surprising if we consider that the costs of multiple voting 
rights shares are easily recognized by professional investors, who therefore discount the price 
paid for these shares. In a recent survey titled “The Tragedy of The Dual Class Commons”, 
the ISS analyzed the Facebook IPO as follows: 
[E]ven a strong distaste among institutional investors for the company’s retrograde 
governance practices is unlikely to diminish the economic success of the IPO. In- 
                                                 
44 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang and Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 
1722 (2009). See also: Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, supra note 23 at 1084, (“In a series of single-
stage regressions, [they] find that firm value is positively associated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively 
associated with insiders’ voting rights, and negatively associated with the wedge between the two”); Scott B. Smart, 
Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai and Chad J. Zutter, What's in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual class equity 
on IPO firm values, 45 J. ACC. ECON. 94, 113 (2008) (Their “results suggest that investors discount dual-class shares 
because the superior voting rights held by insiders makes it difficult for outsiders to replace incumbents”). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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vesting is ultimately about return. While good corporate governance practices, by 
increasing board and management accountability, can provide a robust framework to 
drive  shareholder  value,  this  IPO  event  itself  presents  a  Hobson’s  choice:  accept 
governance structures which diminish shareholder rights and board accountability, or 
miss out on what appears to be one of the hottest business models of the internet 
age.
45  
But if these “retrograde governance practices” are proven costly and inefficient, why 
doesn’t the U.S. regulator follow the GIPS and Israel by endorsing the “one-share one-vote” 
principle? A possible explanation could be that this ownership structure is inefficient ex post, 
but a mandatory provision prohibiting its adoption would be even more costly ex ante.  
Looking at the Facebook case, we can imagine that if Mark Zuckerberg had been 
prevented from maintaining control of the company through Class-B Shares, he would have 
received a higher price for the common shares in the IPO. In addition, he would have felt 
more pressure from the market to manage the business in the most effective way. Unsatisfied 
stockholders would have had the power to remove him as CEO through a proxy contest, or 
other investors could have challenged his control by launching a hostile takeover. Therefore, 
an absolute prohibition of multiple voting right shares would have been efficient from an ex 
post perspective. 
                                                 
45 Intitutional Shareholders Services, The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons (February 13, 2012), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf. For similar comments about Google’s IPO see: 
Simon London, U.S. pension fund criticizes Google's IPO structure. Financial Times, (May 4, 2004), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4900355/#.UTuos6XT0jQ : 
TIAA-Cref, the New York-based teachers' pension fund with $300 billion under management, said that 
corporate governance weaknesses would be reflected in the price it was willing to pay for Google stock. 
"There should be a substantial discount for corporate governance deficiencies," said Peter Clapman, 
senior vice-president and chief counsel for corporate governance. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
 
 
 
21 
However, the ex ante costs of this solution should also be considered. Knowing that he 
cannot secure his control after an IPO, Zuckerberg might have decided to keep Facebook 
private or issued fewer shares to be listed in the market. 
46 This strategy would have reduced 
the financial resources available to the company for expanding its business, or it would have 
induced the firm to rely more on debt to finance its activities, thereby increasing the leverage 
and the riskiness of bankruptcy. 
47  
This solution would have been economically inefficient both for the firm – since it will 
lack the financial resources to grow and prosper – and its controller – because, should he has 
sold the control in the IPO, he would had maximized the value of his participation.  However, 
at  least  in  some  cases,  non-monetary  private  benefits  – s u c h  a s  s e c u r i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  
company the manager has founded and that has rendered him famous and respected – can 
offset the costs of a sub-optimal economic decision. 
48 In this situation,  issuing multiple 
voting  right  shares  allows  the  company  to  raise  equity  capital  on  the  market  without 
                                                 
46 See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 
807, 828 (1987)  
Dominant shareholders of [companies in growing markets with large additional cash flow needs] are 
faced with a dilemma. If they finance growth by further sales of an existing single class of common 
stock, their control of the firm will be diluted. But if they avoid dilution by purchasing enough new 
shares t h e m selves  to  retain  the  same  percentage  of  ownership t hey  will  suffer  an  uncompensated 
increase i n  t h e  u n s y s t e m a t i c r isk  of  their i n vestment  in  the  company.  In  either  event,  this  form  of 
financing growth imposes a cost on dominant shareholders that is not shared by public shareholders.  
47 See for similar considerations: William T. Allen, Comments Respectfully Submitted to the Committee for 
Increasing Competitivness of the Economy of the State of Israel, 5 (Nov. 24, 2011) (Document on file with the author). 
48 Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, Harvard Law School 
John  M.  Olin  Center  for  Law,  Economics  and  Business  Discussion  Paper  Series.  Paper  260,  available  at: 
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/260 : 
Private benefits might be also nonpecuniary. Control might provide larger such benefits to the controller 
when the controller founded the firm, when control of the firm has always resided with the controller’s 
family, or when control of the firm provides the controller with prestige. Thus, other things equal, 
antitakeover charter arrangements should be more common in such situations. 
See also: John C. Coates IV, supra note 17 at 692, reporting that: 
[I]n high technology companies, … part of the incentive for innovators is their sense of ownership over 
the technology itself, in all its possible uses (or, more often, from their perspective, misuses), and the 
initial innovators are very plausibly the highest-valuing owners of the rights to dispose of technology 
they have created. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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depriving  the  dominant  shareholder  of  the  non-monetary  private  benefits  that  he  gains 
through his control. 
49 
 
 
B. Costs and Benefits of Pyramidal Ownership Structures 
1. Costs of Allowing Firms’ Control Through Pyramidal Ownership Structures 
Even  though  corporate  pyramids  “formally”  comply  with  the  one-share  one-vote 
principle – because they don’t require the issuance of different kinds of shares – they allow 
controlling shareholders to achieve the same separation between cash flow rights and voting 
rights  created  by  multiple  voting  rights  shares.  The  entrenchment  of  the  controlling 
shareholders and the agency costs created by this ownership structure have a negative effect 
on the firm’s performance and on the value of its stocks.  
In his final report to the Committee on Increasing Competitiveness, Lucian Bebchuk 
provides e mp i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  s h o wi n g  t h a t  p u b l i c  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  n e g a t i v e l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  
adoption of pyramidal ownership structures. The data reported also shows that the pregiudice 
suffered by the minority shareholders, measured in terms of reduction in value of their stock, 
is directly related to the degree of the separation between the controller cash flow rights and 
his voting rights. 
50 
                                                 
49 See Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 46, at 828. 
50 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 19, at 11; See also Rejie George and Rezaul Kabir, Business groups and 
profit redistribution: a boon or bane for firms?, 61 J. BUS. RES. 1004, 1012 (2008), (“The analysis shows that group-
affiliated  firms  perform  poorly  relative  to  independent  firms”);  Sung  Wook  Joh,  Corporate  governance  and 
profitability: Evidence from Korea before the economic crisis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 287, 318 (2003), using a sample of 
5,829 Korean firms subject to outside auditing during 1993–1997, he found evidence that: 
Firms  with  lower  controlling  family  ownership  or  higher  differences  between  control  rights  and 
ownership rights showed lower performance. […] In addition, Korean firms affiliated with business 
groups in the mid-1990s showed lower profitability than independent firms did. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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Pyramids create a misalignment between the interests of the controller – who usually 
has an interest in over-investing 
51 – and the interests of all other shareholders. In addition, 
the main shareholder usually controls many different companies that do not deal with each 
other  on  a  clear  arms’  length  basis.  And  the  lack  of  transparency  associated  with  these 
“baroque, opaque, and costly structures” 
52 also provides great opportunities for tunneling 
(i.e.  transferring,  directly  or  indirectly,  assets  and  profits  of  a  firm  to  its  controlling 
shareholder). 
53  
These  intricate  and  unclear  controlling  structures  push  investors  to  rely  on  the 
reputation and track record of controlling shareholders, who are usually established families 
with relevant social and political connections. But understanding these social relationships 
usually  proves  to  be  very  difficult  and  costly,  especially  for  foreign  investors. 
54 T hree 
                                                                                                                                                
See also: An Buysschaert, Marc Deloof, Marc Jegers and An Rommens, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in 
Developed Countries? Belgian Evidence, 16 CORPS. GOV. INT. REV. 504, 514 (2008), using a sample that includes 247 
group companies, belonging to 16 different Belgian groups, they found that: 
The  results  for  net  income/total  assets  confirm  the  findings  […]  that  (1)  group  companies  are 
significantly less profitable than stand-alone companies; (2) group companies have more volatile profits 
than stand-alone companies; and (3) receiving group financing is negatively related to the profitability of 
group companies.  
51 Martin Holmén & Peter Hogfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or Agency Costs?, 9 INT. REV. FIN. 133, 
172 (2009) (Corporate pyramids tend “to systematically overinvest since they have access to a relatively inexpensive 
source of capital with lower and softer return requirements than the external capital markets.”). See also: Abe De Jong, 
Douglas V. DeJong, Ulrich Hege and Gerard Mertens,  Leverage in Pyramids: When Debt Leads to Higher Dividends, 
ECGI  - F i n ance  Working  Paper  No.  261/2009  (2010),  at  8,  available  at  30:  http://ssrn.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=1461492 (Finding that, when the holding company is highly leveraged, the “dividend 
payouts [necessary to repay the controller’s debt] may exceed the efficient payout level for the bottom company”). 
52 Luca Enriques, supra note 28 at 507. 
53 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 22 (2000). See also: Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black and Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 13 (2011) (“[P]yramidal and circular ownership structures… provide both incentives and opportunities for the 
controller to tunnel profits up to the top level of the pyramid.”); Jae-Seung Baek, Jun-Koo Kang and Inmoo Lee, 
Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, 61 J. FIN. 2415 
(2006);  Kee-Hong  Bae,  Jun-Koo  Kang  and  Jin-Mo  Kim,  Tunneling or  Value  Added?  Evidence  from  Mergers  by 
Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002); Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta and Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting 
Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002). 
54 Christian Leuz, Karl V.  Lins & Francis Warnock, Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms?, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 3245, 3253-54 (2009). 
Understanding these control structures and the family motives requires intricate social and institutional 
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economists,  using  a  sample  of  4,409  firms  from  twenty-nine  countries  found  that “ U . S .  
investors, which comprise about half of all foreign portfolio investment worldwide, do in fact 
hold fewer shares in foreign firms where managers and their families have high levels of 
control  and  hence  ownership  structures  that  are  more  conducive  to  expropriation  by 
controlling insiders.” 
55 
The  agency  costs  created  by  pyramidal  ownership  structures  and  the  lack  of 
transparency they create cause the minority shareholders who are still interested in investing 
in these companies to demand a discount on the price of their shares. This discount is not 
registered only in legal systems characterized by a low level of investor protection. Even 
though pecuniary private benefits of control are generally considered lower in Sweden than 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
56 two Swedish economists found that: 
One effect of the highly leveraged control structure is that the 25% average discount 
on Swedish [holding companies] between 1986 and 2000 is 13–17% larger than for 
portfolio-oriented  UK  and  US  [holding  companies].  The  extra  discount  is  thus  a 
rough  direct m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  p y r a m i d a l  c o n t r o l  i m p o s e d  o n  o t h e r  
shareholders. But it does not include the negative indirect effects of pyramiding on 
the value of portfolio firms (discounts). 
57 
                                                                                                                                                
potentially problematic governance structures are particularly taxing to foreign investors in terms of 
their information and monitoring costs. 
55 Id at 3246. 
56 See: Tatiana Nenova, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, 68 J. FIN. 
ECON. 325, 334 (Table 3) (2003); Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537 (2004). 
57 Martin Holmén & Peter Hogfeldt, supra note 51 at 144; Konstantin Kosenko, supra note 41 at 89 (In Israeli 
corporate pyramids “the financial value of affiliated companies is significantly lower. These findings are indicative of 
market discounting with respect to affiliated companies”). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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In some situations the affiliation with corporate pyramids can prove to be economically 
efficient for the firms and their shareholders, but detrimental for the market and the society. 
Large business groups controlling companies engaged in related businesses can use their 
strong  position  in  the  relevant  market  to  decrease  competition  to  the  detriment  of  the 
consumers and other stakeholders. 
58 In addition to this problem, families controlling large 
pyramids are more effective in obtaining political representation and governmental support 
that are especially valuable in highly regulated business sectors.
 59 
 
2. Costs of Prohibiting Pyramidal Ownership Structures 
The industrialization of emerging economies requires the simultaneous development of 
many  related  business  activities  (the  so  called  “big  push”). 
60 P y r a m i d a l  g r o u p s ’  
“diversification gives them a presence in every critical industry needed for big push type 
growth”.!61  
Corporate pyramids can also be considered efficient in providing financial resources to 
new firms in emerging markets that are characterized by poor corporate governance, lack of 
transparency and still undeveloped financial intermediaries. In this case, young firms face 
                                                 
58 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 19, at 18; Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Business groups and the big 
push: Meiji Japan’s mass privatization and subsequent growth, 8 ENTERP. SOC. 543, 548 (2007), (“State orchestrated 
collusion, protectionism, and ready subsidies limit the competitive pressures on business groups, permitting inefficient 
operations to survive and compromising economic growth”); Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in 
Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 331, 359 (2007) (“[A]s business groups accumulate 
political and economic influence, the nature of their relations with government tends to change–from government 
protégés to a strong lobby with often captured regulators”); Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, 
Economic Entrenchment and Growth, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 655, 657 (2005): 
[E]ntrusting the governance of huge slices of a country’s corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias capital 
allocation,  retard  capital  market  development,  obstruct  entry  by  outsider  entrepreneurs,  and  retard 
growth.  
59 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 41, at 18; See Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, supra note 58, at 693-699. 
60 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, 53 ECON. J. 202 
(1943). 
61 Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, supra note 58, at 547 (2007); Randall Morck, supra note 21. The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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difficulties in raising external capital because of minority investor expropriation concerns. 
Therefore these firms can be financed more efficiently by controlling shareholders who can 
use their pyramids’ internal capital for this purpose. 
62 
Ronald  Gilson  has  also  argued  that  in  markets  where  commercial  law  is  bad  and 
contractual obligations are difficult to enforce, affiliation with family groups can provide 
value for controlled firms. In this context, exchanges are operated in a “reputation market” 
and “the presence of family ownership, facilitates the development and maintenance of the 
reputation necessary for a corporation’s commercial success.” 
63 
Prohibiting  or  even  discouraging  the  formation  of  pyramidal  ownership  structures 
might therefore be considered undesirable from a cost and benefit perspective in developing 
countries. However, in more developed economies with more efficient capital markets, there 
are fewer opportunities for tunneling and more sophisticated financial intermediaries. Thus 
the  benefits  provided  by  corporate  pyramids  affiliation  are l e s s  e v i d e n t  a n d  a r e  g r e a t l y  
outweighed b y  t h e  a g e n c y  c o s t s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r s ’  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s .  
64 T h i s  
                                                 
62 Ronald W. Masulis, Peter K. Pham & Jason Zein, Family business groups around the world: financing 
advantages, control motivations, and organizational choices, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3556, 3572 (2011); Stijn Claessens, 
Joseph P. H. Fan and Larry H. P. Lang, The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia, 7 EM. 
MARK. REV. 1, 23 (2006) (Finding that in “East Asian countries other than Japan …for a firm with the control stake of 
the largest owner exceeding its ownership stake, valuation gains from group affiliation arise if the firm is older and 
slower-growing; in contrast, value losses arise if the firm is younger and has higher growth.”); Tarun Khanna and 
Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business 
Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 887 (2000) (Their “research suggests that the most diversified business groups add value by 
replicating the functions of institutions that are missing in […] emerging market”); Tarun Khanna and Jan W. Rivkin, 
Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in Emerging Markets, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 45, 68 (2001) 
(Using “data from 14 emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and South Africa [they] find that business groups 
affiliates earn higher accounting profits than do otherwise comparable unaffiliated firms”). 
63 Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 14 at 636. 
64 See: Sung Wook Joh, supra note 50 at 318 (“As the economy develops, the potential benefits of overcoming 
these market imperfections decreases while the cost of agency problems and conflicts of interest between controlling 
family shareholders and minority shareholders can increase”); Ronald W. Masulis, Peter K. Pham & Jason Zein, supra 
note at 3589, note 39 (“[I]n an unreported test, [they] find that the valuation discount of group firms is actually lower in 
emerging markets than in developed markets.”) The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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explains why, in developed countries, group affiliation is usually associated with a reduced 
share value and is therefore considered inefficient by outside investors. 
65 
Even  if  pyramids,  like  multiple  voting  rights  shares,  are  inefficient  ex  post, t h e i r  
prohibition can nevertheless create some costs ex ante. In particular, in countries where other 
kinds  of  CEMs  are  also  prohibited,  if  families  cannot s e c u r e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e i r  c o m p a n i e s  
following an IPO they might decide to keep the firms private. And, even if listed, these 
companies might be reluctant to issue new shares when the controllers lack the financial 
resources  required  to  avoid a  d i l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  their 
reluctance w o u l d  c a u s e  t h e  c o m p a n y  t o  forego p r o f i t a b l e  b u s i n e s s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
Alternatively,  controlled  companies  unable  to  secure  financial  resources  through  equity 
offering would have to rely more heavily on debt to finance their activity, thereby increasing 
leverage to inefficient levels. 
66 
 
C. The Cost of Adopting CEMs: Multiple Voting Rights Shares vs. Pyramidal 
Ownership Structures.  
 Different CEMs have peculiar features that might be more or less suitable for specific 
market conditions. However, in developed countries, both pyramidal ownership structures 
and  multiple  voting  rights  shares  are  associated  with  increased  agency  problems.  These 
problems  affect  the  price  that  minority  investors  are  willing  to  pay  for  the  shares.  As 
                                                 
65 See supra note 50. 
66 L u c i a n  A .  B e b c h u k ,  Interim  Report  Prepared  for  the  Committee  on  Increasing  Competitiveness  in  the 
Economy ( O c t o b e r  9 ,  2 0 1 1 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/Policy/Bebchuk-Shani-
Report.pdf, at 13: (“If controllers continue holding their large groups using other people’s money, but switch from 
outside  equity  financing  to  outside  debt  financing,  leverage  levels  would  rise  above  their  current  high  levels, 
exacerbating systemic risk concerns”). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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empirical evidence suggests, the discount is directly related to the separation of ownership 
and control, whereas the adoption of any specific kind of CEM is not very relevant.
 67 
Looking more specifically at the sensitivity of institutional investors towards these two 
kinds of CEMs, a very similar negative perception is registered:  “[o]n a scale of +1 (very 
positive) to -1 (very negative), […] Pyramid structures (-0.57) are cited as the third most 
negative  CEM  according  to  investors.  Multiple  voting  rights  are  [also]  perceived  very 
negatively (-0.55) by investors”. 
68 However, the discounts that institutional investors apply 
to these two kinds of CEMs operate in a different way.  
In the U.S., the controlling shareholders, who want to secure their control by adopting 
multiple voting rights shares, generally have to issue the preferred shares at the time of the 
IPO. In addition, existing common shares cannot be exchanged with non-voting shares when 
the firm is already listed, although the firm can issue new classes of limited voting or no-
voting stocks. 
These strict regulations are the result of the SEC introduction of rule 19c-4 in the 
1980s. 
69 Even though this provision had been struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court 
70 - 
                                                 
67 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and 
Entrenchment  Effects  of  Large  Shareholdings,  57  J.  FIN. 2 7 4 1 ,  2 7 4 4  ( 2 0 0 2 )  ( U s i n g  a  s a m p l e  o f  E a s t  A s i a n  
corporations). 
68 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
supra note 18, at 85. According to this survey the first and the second most negative CEMs are: (i) the “priority shares” 
(-0.66) (i.e. shares that “grant their holders specific powers of decision or veto rights in a company, irrespective of the 
proportion of their equity stake”); and (ii) the “golden shares” (-0,64) (i.e. “priority!shares!issued!for!the!benefit!of!
governmental!authorities”). 
69 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 565 (1991). 
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which  had  considered i t  b e y o n d  t h e  C o mmission’s  regulatory  authority  - i t  was  in  fact 
nevertheless introduced in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listing requirements. 
71  
The reason of this regulation is described by an influential article written by Ronald 
Gilson, where he argues that “as long as the public shareholders are dispersed, so that efforts 
to organize resistance are costly and no single share-holder owns enough stock to make a 
difference”, the insiders would be able to coerce the approval of transactions that transfer 
value from outside investors to controllers. 
72  
However, if the multiple voting right shares can only be issued before the IPO, in this 
case the outside investors apply the discount caused by this sub-optimal ownership structure 
when they initially buy their shares and hence the controllers/sellers pay the cost of the price 
reduction. 
73 
Pyramid structure can instead be built even after an IPO. An investor can simply create 
a pyramid and then use that structure to buy enough shares of a widely held firm to secure its 
control. Controlling shareholders who kept proportionate voting rights and cash flow rights in 
an IPO can also reduce their economic exposure at a later stage by building up a pyramid that 
                                                 
71 See: WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINER KRAAKMAN AND GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, (N.Y. 2012), 187; Scott B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai and Chad J. Zutter, 
supra  note  44 a t  9 5 ;  Edward  Rock,  Securities  Regulation  as  Lobster  Trap:  A  Credible  Commitment  Theory  of 
Mandatory D i s c l o s u r e ,  23  CARDOZO  L.  REV. 6 7 5 ,  698 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ;  S t e p h e n  M .  B a i n b r i d g e ,  The  Scope  of  the  SEC's 
Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16 (2007), at 8, available at: 
http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=985707, (“Specifically, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt successfully 
pressured  the  three  principal  domestic  securities  exchanges—NYSE,  AMEX,  and  NASDAQ—to  adopt  a  uniform 
voting rights policy essentially tracking Rule 19c-4”). 
72 See: Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 46 at 834; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock 
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (1988) (noting that before the amendment of the 
NYSE,  AMEX  and  NASDAQ  listing  requirements “ [ i ] n  most  cases  this  super-voting  stock r e c e i v e [ d ]  reduced 
dividends, most commonly, 10% less than [was] paid to limited-voting stock. … After the new class of common [was] 
authorized,  the  firm  conduct[ed]  a  one-time  exchange  offer,  in  which  shareholders  may  exchange  their  ordinary 
common for the super-voting common, typically on a one-for-one ratio.”); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINER KRAAKMAN AND 
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 71 at 187. 
73 The same reasoning explains why – unlike the multiple voting rights shares – non voting or limited voting 
shres can be issued (but not exchanged) in “mid-stream”. In this case, the issuance of the new class of shares is not 
coercive, because the insiders cannot exploit the collective action problem.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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hold the participation in the listed firm. 
74 When the “equal opportunity rule” does not apply 
or  is  not  triggered,  they  can  also  sell  their  controlling  bloc  at  a  premium  to  an  existing 
pyramid or a pyramid created ad hoc.  
Therefore,  minority  shareholders  who  have  invested  in  company  with  efficient 
corporate  governance  can  find  themselves  owning  stocks  in a  f i r m  c o n t r o l l e d  t h r o u g h  a  
pyramid. In this situation – in countries like the GIPS that allow the creation of pyramids – 
rational  investors  will  consider  the  likelihood  that t h i s  k i n d  o f  C E M  w i l l  b e  a d o p t e d  
following an IPO and apply the discount caused by this ownership structure when the firm 
initially goes public. Hence, the more it is likely that a listed company will be controlled 
through a pyramid in the near future, the higher the discount that outside investors will apply 
at the time of the IPO.  
If we look at this problem from the perspective of the seller of the shares in the IPO, 
we can argue that he would maximize the value of the participation sold if he could credibly 
commit to the market that his firm will not be controlled in the future through a pyramid. 
 
IV. PRIVATIZATIONS IN ITALY, SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND GREECE: HOW THE VALUE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED FIRMS CAN BE INCREASED BY LIMITING CONTROL ENHANCING MECHANISMS 
The  sovereign  debt  crisis  of  some  European c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  G I P S ,  a n d  t h e  
pressure to reduce their fiscal deficits are pushing governments to consider divesting state-
owned companies. 
75  
                                                 
74 S e e :  ALESSIO  PACCES,  RETHINKING  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE:  THE  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  OF  CONTROL 
POWERS, 210 (2012): 
One or more layers could be added on top of the pyramid, thereby diluting the controller’s ownership 
stake in any lower layer. Minority shareholders of existing layers cannot but be harmed by such a 
strategy; but again they are powerless. In contrast, new outside investors are more easily found on top 
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In July 2013, the Italian Prime Minister announced a plan to privatize some state-
owned  companies,  including:  Poste  Italiane  S.p.A.  (the  former  monopoly  of  the  postal 
service, with an overall group’s revenue of more than €24 billion – i.e. $32 billion – in 2012 
76), Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A. (the primary train operator in Italy, with revenues of more 
than €8 billion – i.e.  $10.5 billion – in 2012 
77), and Fincantieri – Cantieri Navali Italiani 
S.p.A. (the largest ship-builder in Europe, with revenues of more than €2.3 billion – i.e.  $3 
billion – in 2012 
78). 
79 And according to a recent report: 
The newly-elected conservative Greek government reaffirmed, in June 2012, plans to 
raise  at  least  €19  billion  ($25  billion),  and  perhaps  as  much  as  €42  billion  ($55 
billion), from the sale of state assets before the end of 2015…. Additionally, the 
national governments of … Spain, Portugal … and Italy have all articulated multi-
year,  multi-billion-dollar  divestment  plans  to  be  launched  (or  re-launched)  once 
market conditions improve. 
80 
                                                                                                                                                
75 Laura Cabeza-García and Silvia Gómez-Ansón, Post-privatisation Ownership Concentration: Determinants 
and Influence on Firm Efficiency, 39 J. COMP. ECON. 412: 
Privatisation became a priority on government agendas in the past few decades and remains of high 
importance  despite  the  current  global  financial  crisis.  In  fact,  European  countries  such  as  Poland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain are stepping up their divestment programs, in search of greater revenue to 
help reduce fiscal deficits.  
76 S e e :  P o s t e  I t a l i a n e  S . p . A .  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t e m e n t  2 0 1 2 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  
http://www.posteitaliane.post/resources/english/editoriali/pdf/Annual_Report_2012.pdf.  
77 S e e :  F e r r o v i e  d e l l o  S t a t o  S . p . A .  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t e m e n t  2 0 1 2 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  http://www.fsitaliane.it/cms-
file/allegati/fsitaliane/Financial_Statements_FSItaliane_2012.pdf.  
78 S e e :  F i n c a n t i e r i  – C a n t i e r i  N a v a l i  I t a l i a n i  S . p . A .  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t e m e n t  2 0 1 2 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  
http://www.fincantieri.com/CMS/Data/pages/files/000177_resource1_orig.pdf.  
79 See: Alessandro Barbera, Letta riapre la pratica privatizzazioni: Si parte da Fincantieri, Fs e Poste, LA 
STAMPA, Jul. 19, 2013, available at http://www.lastampa.it/2013/07/19/economia/letta-riapre-la-pratica-privatizzazioni-
si-parte-da-fincantieri-fs-e-poste-2LM9DOcEC4XrbvMmSWmWjN/pagina.html;  Marco  Cobianchi,  Eni,  Enel, 
Finmeccanica,  Ferrovie,  Poste:  obiettivo  privatizzazioni,  PANORAMA,  Jul.  19,  2013,  available  at 
http://economia.panorama.it/aziende/eni-enel-finmeccanica-poste-privatizzazioni-saccomanni; Laura Bonadies, Moretti 
(Fs):  pronti  alla  privatizzazione,  MILANO  FINANZA,  Aug.  18,  2013  available  at 
http://www.milanofinanza.it/news/dettaglio_news.asp?id=201308181633201290&chkAgenzie=TMFI.  
80 P r i v a t i z a t i o n  B a r o m e t e r ,  The  PB  Report  2011,  4-5,  available  at: 
http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/PUB/NL/4/9/PB_Report_2011.pdf; Guy Dinmore, Italy Sells Off State Sssets to The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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If the GIPS are really willing to sell the shares of the companies they own, they should 
first create the best conditions to maximize their value in the market. In particular, given the 
current economic downturn in the EU, which has reduced the resources available to national 
investors, GIPS should create the conditions required to attract foreign investors. 
 
A. How will Allowing the Creation of Corporate Pyramids Reduces the Value of 
State-Owned Companies to be Privatized? 
1. Ownership Structures in the GIPS  
In the GIPS, companies with dispersed ownership are quite rare. In Italy, for example, 
in 2012 fewer than 10% of the industrial and service companies (representing only 2,8% and 
0,8%  of  their  respective  market  capitalization)  were  widely  held.  In  Spain,  Portugal  and 
Greece companies with a controlling shareholder are also by far the majority. 
81 
Several factors push towards concentrated ownership structures in these countries. A 
first explanation is based on the high level of monetary and non-monetary private benefit of 
control in these markets. 
82 Other possible explanations consider the benefits of having a 
controlling shareholder monitoring the management of the company 
83 or countervailing the 
demands of strong labor unions. 
84 
In the context privatizing state-owned companies, the lack of companies with dispersed 
ownership in the GIPSs’ markets is particularly relevant because outside investors should 
                                                                                                                                                
Reduce  Debt,  FINANCIAL  TIMES ( J u n e  1 5 ,  2 0 1 2 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/769178de-b701-11e1-
bd0e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2QZPMGoro.  
81 Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, supra note 26. 
82 Tatiana Nenova, supra note 56 at 334; Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, supra note 56 at 551. 
83 See supra Section I.B. 
84 MARL J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS  OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE 
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expect that some – or even most – of the companies sold by the government will also be 
driven to adopt a concentrated ownership structures. 
The “equal opportunity rule”, which applies in the GIPS, provides some protections for 
minority investors when a shareholder acquires a controlling bloc. However, the mandatory 
bid is triggered only when an investor exceeds a threshold level – between 30 and 33 percent 
– of the company’s share capital. And – as some practitioners have noted – this threshold “is 
set too high because, in many cases, shareholders are able to control a European company 
(and  either  block  or  have  a  nearly  insurmountable  advantage  against  other  bidders)  by 
accumulating ownership of shares just below the threshold”. 
85 
In the worst scenario for institutional investors, a corporate raider may use a pyramidal 
ownership structure to acquire a bloc of shares that, even without reaching the threshold 
triggering the mandatory bid, will assure him a very strong – or even complete – control over 
the company. The Telecom Italia case, summarized below, exemplifies this scenario.  
 
2. The Telecom Italia case 
In the period between 1992 and 2000 Italy has privatized some of the largest state-
owned companies. In several cases this result has been achieved through the dispersion of the 
controlling stake on the market. However, most of these firms did not remain publicly held 
for a long time, and soon after the privatization they were acquired by existing business 
groups or pyramids created ad hoc. 
86 
                                                 
85 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Europe M&A: The Evolving Takeover Landscape, available at 
http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/public ations/Europe_MandA_The_Evolving_Takeover_Landscape.pdf.  
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Following  the  privatization  of  the  Italian  state-owned  telecommunication  company 
Telecom Italia (“the sixth largest telecommunication company in the world by turnover”) 
87 
the firm remained widely held for less than two years (from 1997 to 1999) before a pyramid 
controlled by Matteo Colaninno acquired the majority of its share capital through a tender 
offer. After acquisition, the controller tried “to strip Telecom Italia of its most-valued asset, 
the highly profitable cellular phone unit, Telecom Italia Mobile, and transfer it to Tecnost, 
the Olivetti subsidiary used by Mr. Colaninno to purchase control of Telecom Italia”. 
88 In 
2001, when this attempt to restructure the pyramid failed, Mr. Colaninno sold 23% of the 
share  capital  of  Olivetti  – t h e  w e d g e  c o m p a n y  c o n t r o l l i n g  T e l e c o m  I t a l i a  – t o  a n o t h e r  
pyramid controlled by Marco Tronchetti Provera at a 80% premium over the market price – a 
premium that was not shared with the minority shareholders. 
89 
As Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin have documented, Mr. Tronchetti Provera used a 
pyramidal ownership structure, which involved four other companies (two of them listed), 
that in 2005 controlled 18% of the voting rights in Telecom Italia – i.e a controlling bloc – 
while holding only 0,7% of the firm’s cash flow rights. 
90  
                                                 
87 Michele Meoli, Stefano Paleari and Giovanni Urga, When Controlling Shareholders Live Like Kings. The 
Case of Telecom Italia (January 24, 2006), available at: http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=883655.  
88 John Tagliabue, Move by Olivetti Backfires With Sotck Traders, Oct. 1, 1999, N.Y. TIMES, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/01/business/international-business-move-by-olivetti-backfires-with-stock-
traders.html.  
89 P a u l  M a i d m e n t ,  Pirelli,  Benetton  Team  Up  To  Grab  Olivetti,  FORBES,  July  27,  2001,  available  at 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/07/30/0730telecomitalia_print.html, (Noting that Mr. Tronchetti Provera was “effectively 
gaining control of Italy's leading industrial group, with a stock market capitalization of 55 billion euros, for 7 billion 
euros  in  cash.”);  Greg  Burke,  All  In  The  Families,  TIME  MAGAZINE,  Aug.  13,  2001,  available  at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,170116,00.html#ixzz2QHSAb16P:  
By keeping their share of Olivetti under 30%, Pirelli [a company controlled by Mr. Tronchetti Provera] 
and  Benetton  [one  of  his  allies]  were  not  obliged  to  offer  the  buy-out  to  all  investors.  Minority 
shareholders are understandably furious, especially since Olivetti dropped 15.3% the first day after the 
deal. 
90 Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 
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The bottom line is that the outside investors who bought the stocks of Telecom Italia 
when  it  was  privatized  soon f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  holding  shares i n  a  c o m p a n y  w i t h  a n  
inefficient ownership structure that allowed the controlling shareholder to use a very wide 
pyramid to control the company while maintaining a trivial economic stake in it. 
 
3.  Why  Would  Prohibiting  Corporate  Pyramids I n c r e a s e  t h e  V a l ue  of  the 
Privatizations? 
If institutional investors understand that widely held firms in the GIPS are relatively 
unstable, 
91 and that it is possible – or even likely – that other investors will be able to take 
control of these companies without triggering the “equal opportunity rule”, they will evaluate 
their  possible  ownership  structures  and  the  agency  costs  they  create  in  the  controlled 
companies.  
In particular, institutional investors considering buying shares in the privatizations of 
state owned companies in the GIPS will evaluate the risky possibility that, in the near future, 
these companies will be controlled by pyramidal ownership structures, as it has happened in 
the Telecom Italia case. If these investors fear that the investee company could – or is likely 
to – become a member of a pyramid, they would not buy any participation in that company, 
or they would ask for a discount on the shares price. 
92 
Therefore, if GIPS want to maximize the price of the shares of state-owned companies 
in the privatization process – and, in particular, if they want to attract foreign investors who 
                                                 
91 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 48, at 37 (“When control is valuable, leaving it up for grabs will invite 
attempts to grab it and will not constitute an equilibrium.”) 
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are extremely adverse to corporate pyramids 
93 – they should prevent the subsequent adoption 
of this kind of ownership structure. From this point of view, it would be rational for the 
GIPS, which have already issued regulations prohibiting the adoption of multiple voting right 
shares, to endorse an even stricter application of the proportionality principle and to tackle 
the widespread use of pyramid structures in their economies. 
 
B. The Olson Problem: the Resistance of Established Economic and Political Elite 
to Changes in Corporate Governance 
Even  if p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  G I P S  come  to r e c o g n i z e  t h e  c o s t s  c r e a t e d  b y  
corporate pyramids – i.e, come to understand why the United States at the beginning of the 
last century, and, more recently, Israel, came to adopt reforms aimed at discouraging the 
creation and retention of pyramids – it will be extremely difficult for them to approve any 
reforms aimed at solving this problem in a relatively short period of time. This is because the 
families that control pyramidal groups will use their economic power and influence over the 
political process to oppose any reform against their interests. 
As  Ronald  Gilson  recognized  with  regards  to  developing  economies  based  on 
relational exchanges, an “Olson problem” 
94 arises when, for example, controlling “families 
will  have  both  the  incentive  and  the  resources  to  make  more  difficult  or  to  block,  the 
                                                 
93 See Christian Leuz, Karl V. Lins & Francis Warnock, supra note 54 at 3253-4. 
94 According to the theory elaborated by Mancur Olson, small groups can act to advance their common interest 
more easily than large ones. Large groups face collective action problems that reduce their ability to act in furthrance of 
their interest. On the other hand, member of small groups receive a higher per capita participation on the benefits of 
their common action and therefore have lower cost in organizing their efforts. Therefore, in some situations special 
interest lobbys are able to advance their benefits even if the mesures advocated are inefficient for the market and the 
economy. See: Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale Univ. Press 1982) The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
Value in the Privatization of State-Owned Firms in Europe 
 
 
 
37 
development  of  formal  institutions  that  devalue  the  families’  investment  in  relation-
supporting institutions”. 
95 
With regard to the use of CEMs by controlling shareholders, a case in point is the 
European Commission’s unsuccessful attempt to enhance the “one-share one-vote” principle 
in the EU internal market. 
96 A “draft of the EU takeover directive, which threatened to limit 
the use of super-voting shares in cases of takeovers... was tabled in late 2001, the Swedish 
owner-families – led by the Wallenbergs – successfully lobbied the [Swedish] government in 
order to defend voting right distortions against EU legislation”. 
97 
 
                                                 
95 Ronald J. Gilson, suora note 14 at 653; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Robert W. Vishny, Investor protection and corporate governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 21 (2000) (“What the reformers 
see as protection of investors, the founding families call ‘expropriation of entrepreneurs’. No wonder, then, that in all 
countries - from Latin America to Asia to Europe - the families have opposed legal reform”); Lucian A. Bebchuk and 
Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1089 (2010) (They identify several 
“factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection, including corporate insiders’ ability to use public firms’ assets 
to influence politicians, and institutional investors’ inability to capture fully the value of investor protection for outside 
investors.”); Gerhard Schnyder, Varieties of Insider Corporate Governance: the determinants of business preferences 
and govenrance reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1434, 1447 (2012): 
while electoral pressures may push parties to cater for the needs of minority shareholders where these 
constitute a large part of the electorate, the preferences of the business élite constitutes a second channel 
through which ownership structures influence the politics of corporate governance reforms. Which one 
of these pressures ultimately prevails is an empirical question which depends on additional variables, 
such as the power and preferences of centre-left parties, the salience of an issue and the intensity of 
business lobbying. 
96 S e e :  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t ,  M o d e r n i s i n g  
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, Brussels, 
21.5.2003 COM (2003) 284 final, at 14; Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, Brussels, 10 January 2002; Tobias Buck, Eu to endorse ’one-share, one- vote’ principle, Oct. 16, 2005, 
FINANCIAL  TIMES,  available  at  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2f2a10c0-13cb-11dc-9866-
000b5df10621.html#axzz2QJ6ajbPU ( R e p o r t i n g  t h a t  C h a r l i e  M c C r e e v y  – t h e  E U  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  c o m m i s s i o n e r  – 
publicly said “[i]t is my goal to get the one share, one-vote principle accepted across the 25 member states”). 
97 Gerhard Schnyder, supra note 95 at 1445; Keeping shareholders in their place: Bosses around the world 
celebrate  a  series  of  victories  over  shareholder  activists,  Oct.  11,  2007,  THE  ECONOMIST,  available  at 
http://www.economist.com/node/9961252, (The European Commission had to abandon the proposed reform mainly 
because of the strong opposition of “lobbyists for big shareholders such as Sweden's Wallenberg family, which uses 
special  shares  to  retain  control  of  the  dynasty's  businesses”);  André  Nilsen,  The  EU  Takeover  Directive  and  the 
Competitiveness of European Industry, The Oxford council on Good Governance, OCGG Analysis, n°1, (2004), at 4, 
(Reporting that the proposal for “expanding the scope of Article 11 [of the EU Takeover Directive] to outlaw multiple 
classes  of  common  stock  carrying  different  voting  rights”  was  abandoned  “[f]ollowing  intense  lobbying b y  t h e  
Wallenberg family and the rest of the Swedish establishment in 2003”). The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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C. The Israeli Approach to Existing Pyramidal Ownership Structures 
As we have seen in section II.D of this paper, Israel has embarked on a public debate 
over t h e  e c o n o m i c  c o s t s  o f  p y r a m i d a l  o w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  s y s t e m i c  r i s k s  t h a t  t h e y  
create, and possible ways to reduce or eliminate them from the Israeli economy. 
In 2009 the Bank of Israel suggested that: 
To contend with the acute concentration and the pyramid structure of ownership in 
the Israeli economy, one may consider imposing a dividend tax on capital transfers 
between  firms  (as  was  done  in  the  US  in  the  1930s)  or  strengthening  the  direct 
linkage between ownership and control of affiliated companies (a British solution 
from the 1960s) by setting a minimum threshold for direct ownership.
98 
Following the appointment of the Committee on Increasing Competitiveness, Lucian 
Bebchuk  wrote  an  Interim  Report  in  2011  and  a F i n a l  Report  in  2012,  each  of  which 
advanced a different approach to reducing the importance of pyramids in the Israeli economy. 
 
1. The Market Based Solution Proposed in the Interim Report 
In  the  Interim  Report  to  the  Committee  on  Increasing  Competitiveness,  Bebchuk 
proposed to adopt solutions aimed, inter alia,  at:  increasing  the  independence  of  outside 
investors,  expanding  the  authority  of  the  audit  committee,  requiring  the  approval  by  a 
majority  of  outside  investors  to  enter  into c e r t a i n  c o r p o r a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  c r e a t i n g  a  
“‘mandatory bid’ mechanism tailored for the protection of public shareholders in the event of 
                                                 
98 B a n k  o f  I s r a e l ,  A n n u a l  R e p o r t ,  2 0 0 9  ( J e r u s a l e m ,  2 0 1 0 ) ,  1 7 4 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.boi.org.il/en/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Documents/Doch2009/pe_4.pdf.  The Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create 
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wedge-creating transfers”, 
99 providing an exit right to minority shareholders of a controlled 
company and putting a “cap on voting not backed by cash flow rights”. 
100 
In  particular,  the  proposed  exit  right  for  outside  investors  was a  “ m a r k e t  b a s e d  
mechanism” that would be triggered “in the event that a premium offer for all the shares of 
…  [a] c o m p a n y  t h a t  [outside i n v e s t o r s ]  f i n d  a t t r a c t i v e  i s  b l o c k e d  b y  t h e  [company’s] 
controller.” 
101 According to the proposed regulation, this exit right was conditioned on: (i) 
the existence of a hostile tender offer - providing for at least a 10 percent market’s premium – 
that was conditioned on obtaining control of the company; (ii) the acceptance of that offer by 
the  majority  of  minority  shareholders;  and  (iii)  the  controller’s  refusal  to  sell  its  shares 
causing the failure of the takeover. In such a case, the controlling shareholder who blocked 
the offer would be forced to buy the shares of minority shareholders who are willing to sell at 
the same price and conditions offered by the initial bidder. 
The cap on voting rights not backed by cash flow rights for which the Committee on 
Increasing Competitiveness “decided to seek public comment” recommends that “the votes 
attached to a block of 25% or more will count beyond 25% only to the extent they are backed 
by  cash  flow  rights”. 
102 H o w e v e r ,  a s  B e b c h u k  suggests,  “[a]  stronger  version  of  this 
mechanism  – w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  v i s -à-vis  wedge  companies  in  which  the 
controller has only a small minority of the cash flow rights – would require that the holder of 
any block of 5% or more would be allowed to cast votes only up to the level backed by the 
                                                 
99 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 66, at 9-10. 
100 Id at 10. 
101 Id at 8. 
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blockholder’s  cash  flow  rights.” 
103  As  expected,  the  proposals  contained  in  the  Interim 
Report were strongly challenged by Israeli pyramidal groups. 
104 
 
2. The Solution Proposed in the Final Report 
During the consultations which followed the publishing of the Interim Report some 
members of Israeli business groups and some academics criticized the reforms proposed, 
highlighting their possible implementation costs. 
105 
These remarks were considered in the Final Report submitted to the Committee on 
Increasing Competitiveness in 2012, in which Bebchuk proposed the adoption of a more 
straightforward regulation that simply prohibits the creation of new pyramids with more than 
two  layers  of  companies,  and  requires  existing  pyramids  to  reduce  their  structure  to 
maximum  three  layers  in  a  four  years  period  of  time.
  106  This  because  by  reducing  the 
permitted  levels  in  a  pyramidal  ownership  structure,  the  proposed  reform  increases  the 
economic investment that the main shareholder need to hold in the operating company in 
order to secure his control. 
107 
 
                                                 
103 Id . 
104 Among the opponents of the proposals contained in the Interim Report: Professors Ronald J. Gilson and 
Alan Schwartz had been retained by Israeli corporate groups Norstar Holdings Inc., Gazit Globe Ltd. and Alony Hetz 
Properties & Investments Ltd. to write a divergent report that highlights the possible drawbacks of Bebchuk’s solutions 
and in which they propose to contrasts the agency costs created by Israeli pyramid by strengthening the ex-post judicial 
review; and Professor William T Allen had also been asked by the Association of Pubibly Traded Companies to review 
the Interim Report. See: Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz, supra note 16; William T. Allen supra note 47. 
105 The Committee on Increasing Competitiveness in the Economy, Final Recommendations and Supplement 
to the Interim Report (March 18, 2012) at 14, available at: http://www.israeltrade.org.au/final-recommendations-and-
expert-opinions-of-the-committee-on-increasing-competitiveness-in-the-economy/.  
106 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 19, at 21-25. 
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3. Why GIPS Should Follow a Different Approach to Reform from the One Endorsed 
by Israel 
The  legislative  process  to  adopt  the  proposals  made  by  Committee  on  Increasing 
Competitiveness  has n o t  been  completed.  It  is  difficult  to  predict  whether  the  Israeli 
government will succeed in introducing this reform in a relatively short period of time in the 
face  of s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  from t h e  f a m i l i e s  that  control t h e  affected  business  groups. 
However, even if the Israeli government can achieve this result, the GIPS are unlikely to 
overcome organized lobbies of pyramid controllers. 
Given the Olson problem explained before, in order to overcome the interested groups’ 
resistance  a  great  political  support  to  these  reforms i s  r e q u i r e d .  In  the  US,  the  great 
depression created the conditions for the New Deal Congress to introduce the intercompany 
dividends that caused – or at least accelerated – the dismantlement of pyramids. 
108 In Israel, 
because “pyramidal groups bring under one command firms that operate in different markets 
… [they] increase the opportunities for a wide range of multi-market interactions that can 
result  in  reduced  competition  and  higher  pricing.” 
109 I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  
competitiveness  issue,  the  large,  interconnected  and  highly  leveraged  pyramidal  groups 
create  systemic  risks  for  its  economy.  Therefore, t h e  I s r a e l i  G o v e r n m e n t  was s t r o n g l y  
motivated to reduce the threat posed to the economy by corporate pyramids. 
 The economic crisis that has affected the GIPS in the last years can constitute a strong 
incentive to consider reforms aimed at strengthening their firms and attract foreign investors. 
However, given the weakness of their political institutions, and the strong power that leading 
                                                 
108 See previous section II.A. 
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industrial families enjoy in these countries, it is unlikely that these kinds of reforms can be 
promulgated soon-enough to meet the GIPS financial needs. 
Even if the GIPS could deal with the Olson problem, it should also be considered that 
any reform aimed at dismantling all current pyramids – and/or preventing the creation of new 
ones – would also cause some costs and inefficiencies, as we have seen in section III.B.2 of 
this  paper.  In  particular,  if  controlling  shareholders  are  prevented  from  using  pyramidal 
ownership structures to secure their control, some of them might choose to keep their firms 
private, or issue fewer shares in the market, and rely more on debt to finance their firms’ 
activities.  
Alternatively, firms that are controlled through pyramids could also take advantage of 
the right of “freedom of establishment” in the European Union – as the European Court of 
Justice has broadly interpreted this principle following the Centros case 
110 – and choose to 
incorporate their firms in other European countries where CEMs are still permitted, such as 
Sweden or the Netherlands. 
111  
 
                                                 
110 See: Case C-127/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR, I-1459; Case C-208/00 
Überseering B.V v Nordic Construction Baumanagement GmbH [NCC], [2002] ECR, I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd., [2003] ECR, I-10155; Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató 
Szoláltató bt [2008] ECR, I-9641. See also: Wolf-Georg Ringe, Corporate Mobility in the European Union – A Flash 
in the Pan? An Empirical Study on the Success of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition, 6 (April 9, 2013). Oxford 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 34/2013, available at: http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=2247323: 
The Centros case law has had a significant impact on company activity in Europe. With every free 
movement judgment handed down from Luxembourg, enterprises became increasingly assured that the 
freedom of establishment indeed allowed them to register in Member State A, while conducting their 
business exclusively in Member State B. In this manner, the Court of Justice has created a market for 
corporate forms within the European Union, granting de facto a choice between the legal forms of 
Member States.  
111 In these two countries, for example, insiders can use both corporate pyramids and multiple voting rights 
shares to secure their control over the company. Cfr. Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling and the 
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D.  Regulatory  Dualism:  What  Brazilian  “Novo M e r c a d o ”  C a n  T e a c h  t o  O l d  
Europe 
In order to solve the deadlock situation that is likely to arise if the governments of the 
GIPS try to challenge the control that powerful families exercise over their corporate groups, 
and to avoid the costs that would be caused by a general prohibition from adopting pyramidal 
ownership structures, these countries should use regulatory dualism to maximize the value of 
their state-owned enterprises. “Regulatory dualism seeks to avoid, or at least mitigate, the 
Olson problem by permitting the existing business elite to be governed by the prereform 
regime,  while  pursuing  development  by  allowing  other  businesses  to  be  governed  by  a 
reformed regime”. 
112 
This regulatory strategy was used successfully in Brazil a decade ago, when the São 
Paolo Stock Exchange introduced the “Novo Mercado” listing standard. In the last fifty years 
of  the  last  century, t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n  e f f i c i e n t  capital  market  in  that c o u n t r y  was 
impeded by the lack of a sufficient level of investors protection. As Ronald Gilson, Henry 
Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler report, any reform aimed at improving the efficiency of 
Brazilian corporate law had been jeopardized by the families controlling the largest listed 
firms, who – through their lobbying group, the Brazilian Association of Public Companies – 
had been able to block any enhancement of investor protection that would have reduced their 
private benefits of control. 
113 
In order to solve this deadlock situation and improve investor protection, at least in the 
companies that were to be listed in the future, in 2000 the São Paolo Stock Exchange created 
                                                 
112 Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: 
Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S. and the EU, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 478 (2011). 
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three new markets with improved corporate governance standards (Novo Mercado, Level I 
and Level II). 
114 
The Novo Mercado has the highest level of investors’ protection, requiring the listed 
firms to have: 
[O]nly common shares (no non-voting preferred shares); a minimum of 25% free 
float (shares not controlled by the majority shareholders); a board of directors having 
non-staggered terms of two years or less; financial statements prepared following 
U.S. GAAP or IFRS; takeout rights for minority shareholders in a transfer of the 
controlling stake; in a freezeout or delisting, a tender offer must be made for minority 
shares  at  their  economic  values;  trades  by  controlling  shareholders  and  senior 
managers must be disclosed; and disputes with minority shareholders are settled by 
the Brazilian arbitration panel Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado. 
115 
These requirements are imposed only on the firms that voluntarily choose to be listed 
in the Novo Mercado. Other firms can continue to be listed in the old market or in one of the 
other  two  new  markets  – L e v e l  I  o r  L e v e l  I I  – w i t h  l o w e r  l e v e l  o f  i n v e s t o r  p r o t e c t i o n .  
Because the established industrial families were not directly affected by this reform, they had 
fewer incentives and arguments to oppose the introduction of the new markets. 
                                                 
114 Id at 486; Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho and Joelson Oliveira Sampaio, The Evolution of 
Corporate  Governance  in  Brazil, N o r t h w e s t e r n  L a w  &  E c o n  R e s e a r c h  P a per  No.  12-22  (2012),  available  at: 
http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=2181039.  
115 Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho and Joelson Oliveira Sampaio, supra note 114 at 5; Ronald 
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The data available shows the success of the Novo Mercado. From 2004 to 2009, 105 
companies,  representing  72%  of  the  IPOs  registered  in  that  period  of  time,  chose  this 
market.
116 
 
E. Listing State-Owned Companies in a New Market with Enhanced Corporate 
Governance Rules Limiting Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
1. Introducing Regulatory Dualism in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece 
If GIPS want to privatize some of their state-owned companies – or want to sell the 
controlling bloc of already-listed firms through dispersion of the shares in the public market 
117 – and they want to achieve the highest possible price and in a relatively short period of 
time,  they  should  reflect  on  the  Brazilian  experience  with  the  Novo  Mercado,  and  use 
regulatory  dualism  to  create  one  or  more  new  markets  with  high  corporate  governance 
standards that would attract foreign institutional investors. 
The new markets could be created at a national level or even at a multinational or 
European  level.  Having  a  multinational  or  European  market  with  enhanced  corporate 
governance  rules  would  help  to  promote  the  reliability  and  stability  of  the  initiative. 
However, creating transnational political convergence over this project could also prove to be 
difficult and delay the reform.  
                                                 
116 Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, supra note 112 at 495. 
117 If the State own just a controlling bloc of a listed firm, and the “equal opportunity” rule does not apply, the 
private placement of the participation would create more value than the dispersion on the stock in the market, because 
the seller receive the controlling premium without sharing this value with outside investors. In this scenario, since this 
premium is closely related to the private benefit of control that the buyer can extract, in order to mazimize the price 
received, it would be better for the seller to avoid any improvement of outside shareholders rights. Therefore firms that 
are controlled by the State and could be sold at an higher price through private placement should not be listed in the 
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This new market should be used by national governments for the IPOs of their state 
owned companies that are still private, and also to sell their participation in already-listed 
firms that are willing to migrate to the new market. The new market should also be open to 
any  other  firm  that  is  willing  to  comply  with  the  high  corporate  governance  standards 
imposed  by  its  listing  rules.  Having  an  improved  capital  market  with  effective  investor 
protection rules designed to attract foreign institutional investors would be especially useful 
for small and medium-size firms that are financially constrained and that because of their size 
and lack of track record, face a high cost of capital in the regular equity market. 
118 
The introduction of a new market could enhance the venture-capital and private equity 
activity in the GIPS because it would create a more economically efficient exit strategy for 
venture capital and private equity funds that have invested in successful high-growth start-up 
or small firms. 
119 
 
                                                 
118 With regards to Italy, in 2012, only 279 Italian companies were listed in the Milan stock exchange, while in 
Frankfurt the German companies were 665, in Paris the French ones were 862 and in London the British ones were 
2,179. In the same year the market capitalization devided by the GDP was only 23.9% in Italy, while in the UK was 
124%,  in  France  69.8%  and  in  Germany  43.7%.  These  numbers  are  particulary  impressive  if  we  consider  that 
according to Assonime (the Assciation of Italian Companies) more then one thousand Italian companies already have 
the characteristics required for listing in a stock market but prefer to remain private.  
In Portugal and Greece the market capitalization devided by the GDP is also considerably low (30.8 in Portugal 
and 17.9 in Greece in 2012), while Spain is the only economy among the GIPS with a relatively developed capital 
market (73.7% of the GDP in 2012).  
See:  data  available  on  the  World  Bank  web-site: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS/countries/1W?display=default; Luigi Abete, Audizione del 
Presidente dell’Assonime: Indagine Conoscitiva sui Mercati degli Strumenti Finanziari, (May 3, 2011), available at: 
http://www.assonime.it/AssonimeWeb2/servletAllegati?numero=3772. 
119 Bernard S. Black and Ronald J. Gilson, Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus 
stock markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998): 
Other  countries  have  openly  envied  the  U.S.  venture  capital  market  and  have  actively,  but 
unsuccessfully, sought to replicate it. We offer an explanation for this failure: We argue that a well 
developed stock market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is 
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2. The Most Relevant Rule of the New Market: a Cap on Voting Rights not Backed by 
Cash Flow Rights 
As shown by the data mentioned in section III above, institutional investors consider 
the ownership structure of a firm carefully when they evaluate the price of its shares. If that 
company is controlled through a pyramid – or if it is possible that it will be in the future – 
institutional investors will require a discount on the price they pay in order to compensate for 
the agency costs created by this inefficient ownership structure. 
To deal with this issue – and to assure outside investors that controlling shareholders 
will be required to hold a proportionate amount of cash flow rights and voting rights – I 
suggest that the new market to be introduced resemble some of the characteristics of the 
reform proposed by Professor Bebchuk in the Interim Report for Israel. 
In particular, the provision of a 5 percent cap on voting rights not backed by cash flow 
rights – establishing that “the votes attached to a block of […] 5 percent or more will 
count beyond […] 5 percent only to the extent they are backed by cash flow rights” 
120 – 
would  be  extremely  effective  in  avoiding  the  creation  of  pyramids.  This  because  this 
percentage is too low to enable an investor to exercise effective control over a company, yet 
it  would  also  allow  existing  groups  to  invest  in  these  firms  by  acquiring  a  minority 
participation (below 5 percent) with voting rights proportionate to their economic investment.  
This cap on voting rights not backed by cash flow can be introduced by requiring all 
entities holding more than 5 percent of the stocks to provide at the record date – which 
should not be too close to the meeting (i.e. ten or fifteen working days before it) – a statement 
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describing their ownership structure and the existence of any equity derivative having the 
effect of separating their voting rights from their economic exposure in the same firm. 
121 
Then  the  Internal  Audit  Committee  –  to  be  composed  entirely  of i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s ,  
including one director elected by the minority shareholders 
122 – will have to determine what 
the cash flow rights are of the ultimate owner of the pyramid, calculate the voting rights that 
could be exercised in the shareholders’ meeting, and communicate the decision to the market. 
If that shareholder – or other investors of the firm – disagree with this determination, they 
should have the right to have this decision subject to judicial review by an arbitration panel 
similar to the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado created by the Novo Mercado. 
123 This 
arbitration panel should decide any disagreement regarding the cap on voting rights in a few 
days, before the shareholders meeting. 
 
3. Other Relevant Provisions Aimed at Protecting Outside Investors: Ex ante control of 
self-dealing transactions 
In  addition  to  limiting  the  voting  rights  of  pyramids,  the  new  market  should  also 
establish a superior set of corporate governance provisions. These rules should have a focus 
                                                 
121 On the possible use of equity derivatives in order to separate investors’ voting rights from their ultimate 
economic exposure in the same firm see: Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt 
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008). 
122 In Italy the Investor Protection Act (“Legge sul Risparmio”) introduced in 2005, have required all listed 
companies to adopt a “voto di lista” mechanisms that allows minority shareholders to elect at least one member of the 
board. In Spain and in Portugal the adoption of mechanisms similar to the “voto di lista” is authorized but not required. 
See, for Italy, Article 147-ter of the Financial Markets Consolidated Act (“Testo Unico della Finanza”) as amended in 
2005; for Spain Article 137 of the Anonimous Companies Act (“Ley de Sociedades anonimas”, Royal Legislative 
Decree  1564/1989);  See  also,  Simone  Alvaro,  Giovanni  Mollo  e  Giovanni S i c i l i a n o ,  Il  voto  di  lista  per  la 
rappresentanza di azionisti di minoranza nell’organo di amministrazione delle società quotate, 16-17 (2012) Consob, 
Quaderni  Giuridici,  available  at: 
http://www.consob.it/main/consob/pubblicazioni/studi_analisi/quaderni_giuridici/qg1.html.  
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on insider dealing transactions that are particularly relevant in markets, like the GIPS, where 
concentrated  ownership  is  very  common. 
124  This  is  because  “[w]hen  the  targets  of 
expropriation  by  large  investors  are  other  investors,  the  adverse  incentive  effect  of  such 
expropriation is the decline of external finance”. 
125 
In particular the listing standards should, inter alia, provide: (a) enhanced mandatory 
disclosure regarding related parties transactions, because – as Justice Brandeis said almost a 
century  ago  – “ [s]un-light  is  said  to  be  the  best  of  disinfectants,  electric  light  the  most 
efficient policeman”; 
126  (b) that the negotiation of the terms of any material related parties 
transaction should be delegated to the Internal Audit Committee, which should have adequate 
resources to hire its own legal and financial consultants, and should negotiate on an arms’ 
length b a s i s ; 
127 ( c )  in  addition  (and  not  as  an  alternative)  to  (b),  the  approval  by  the 
majority of the minority shareholders should also be required for the most important related 
parties transactions. 
 
                                                 
124 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, The law and economics of 
self-dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008). 
125 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 760 (1997). 
126 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How The Bankers Use It, 92 (Augustus Kelley ed., 1971) 
(1914). 
127 In Italy the Consob Regulation n. 17221 on Related Party Transactions introduced in 2010 has already 
substantially improved the corporate governce rules on this issue. However, Italian listed companies still enjoy some 
degree of freedom in “opting-up” or “opting-down” some of the default rules provided in the new regulation. In this 
case the new market should restrict the companies’ freedom to “opt-down” from the default rules and require the 
adoption  of  the  strictest  procedures  aimed  at  avoiding  tunneling  through  related  parties  transactions.  See:  Angela 
Ciavarella, Luca Enriques, Valerio Novembre and Rossella Signoretti, Regulation and Self-Regulation of Related Party 
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4. Improving Ex Post Judicial Review Through the Appointment of an Arbitration 
Panel 
As  Professors R o n a l d  G i l s o n  a n d  A l a n  S c h w a r t z  emphasize, t h e  “ effectiveness  of 
judicial review – both the quality of the judges and the institutional structure that provides an 
unbiased outcome within a commercially reasonable period of time – is more important than 
the detail of the legal standard that a country adopts.”  
The Chancery Court of Delaware – the state where more than half of the U.S. listed 
companies  are  incorporated 
128  – h a s  b e c o m e  famous  among  corporate  lawyers  and 
international institutional investors for its competence and promptness in handling even the 
most complex corporate and securities’ litigations. 
129 In the GIPS, however, the general 
perception of the effectiveness of the judicial systems is far less positive than in Delaware. 
For example – due to the lack of available resources and the excessive and heterogeneous 
caseload that Italian Judges must decide – the “dominant impression concerning Italy is that 
private  enforcement  [i.e. s h a r e h o l d e r s ’  s u i t s ]  is  under-developed  because  courts  are 
extremely slow and inefficient.” 
130 
In order to improve judicial enforcement, the listing rules of the new market should 
establish the appointment of an arbitration panel, composed of scholars and/or practitioners 
                                                 
128 Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over 
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 567 (2002) (Reporting that at the end of 1999, 3771 of 6530 US public 
companies were incorporated in Delaware). 
129  Ronald  J.  Gilson,  Charles  Sabel  and  Robert  E.  Scott,  Contract  and  Innovation:  The  Limited  Role  of 
Generalist Courts, 88 N.Y.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2013): 
The specialization of the [Delaware] court together with its equitable powers assure parties that, despite 
the impossibility of codifying particularized decision rules, judicial decisions will be taken with the 
fullest possible awareness of current and evolving understandings of good practice.  
130 Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Guidici, Financial Scandals and the role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat 
Case in After Enron, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION 158, 
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specialized in corporate governance issues regarding listed companies. The Panel should be 
required to decide competently and in a timely manner any disputes among shareholders and 
between the shareholders and the firm. In order to improve the predictability of its decisions 
the arbitration panel should also be bound by its own precedents. 
 
5. How to Guarantee Firms Compliance with the Listing Rules 
In order to guarantee outside investors that the firms will continue to comply with the 
improved corporate governance standards imposed by the new market, 
131 these provisions 
should  be  inserted  in  the  corporations’ c h a r t e r s .  To  amend  the  charters t h e  a p p r o v a l  b y  
investors representing a vast majority of the voting rights exercisable in the shareholders’ 
meeting (e.g. 75 percent of the overall voting rights), should be required. 
132  
In addition to this supermajority requirement to amend the charter, listed firms should 
also face some constraints on delisting or switching to other listing markets. This result can 
be achieved by requiring any person wishing to delist a firm from the new market to launch a 
tender offer for all the company’s shares at a price at least equal to the highest among the 
                                                 
131 On the importance od requiring a strong commitment by the listed firms to comply with the high standards 
of corporate governance imposed by the new market see: Edward Rock, supra note 71: 
[He] argue[s] that the existing SEC system can be understood as providing issuers with a mechanism for 
making a credible commitment to high quality, comprehensive disclosure for an indefinite period into 
the future. This credible commitment device is particularly useful to new domestic issuers and to foreign 
issuers seeking to tap the U.S. capital markets. This credible commitment justification explains the 
striking but little discussed practical and formal asymmetry between the ease of entry into the SEC 
system and the difficulty of exit from it. 
132 In case of companies’ mergers – in order to avoid hold-up problems that could jeopardize value-enhancing 
business combinations – the chater could also provide, as an alternative to the supermajority approval, a positive vote 
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following two parameters: (i) a 10 percent premium over the 3 months average market price; 
or (ii) the highest price paid in the last 6 months by the controlling shareholder.
 133 
If the regulatory authority decides that a company should be delisted for violations of 
the listing rules, investors should have an appraisal right to cash-out their investment at a fair 
market price. As in the Novo Mercado, the regulatory authority should also be allowed to 
“impose  fines  and  suspend  stock  trading  in  case  of  noncompliance  with  the  segment's 
standards.” 
134 
 
CONCLUSION 
Empirical studies have documented the agency costs associated with the separation 
between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights. These costs lead 
institutional investors to expect a discount on the share price of companies adopting CEMs. 
The GIPS have already recognized this problem and have prohibited the adoption of some 
kinds  of  CEMs,  such  as m u l t i p l e  v o t i n g  r i g h t s  s h a r e s .  H o w e v e r ,  p y r a m i d a l  o w n e r s h i p  
structures – which are allowed and widely used in these countries – can be used to achieve 
the same entrenchment in control. Furthermore, corporate pyramids can be adopted following 
the firm’s IPO without requiring the consent of the minority investors.  
These inefficient ownership structures are particularly aversed by foreign institutional 
investors,  who  are  in  a  disadvantaged  position  vis-à-vis n a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  
information regarding the reputation and track record of families controlling the pyramid. 
                                                 
133 See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, supra note 112 at 492 (“[p]ersons wishing to 
delist a firm from the Novo Mercado must first launch a tender offer for the firm's shares at a price at least equal to 
their economic value”). 
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Therefore  if  the  GIPS g o v e r n m e n t s  w a n t  t o  m a x imize  the  value  of  their  state-owned 
companies and attract foreign investors, they should put in place normative tools aimed at 
discouraging the creation of pyramids controlling these companies. In the New Deal period, 
the United States used the taxation of intercompany dividends to oppose the use of pyramids, 
while  Israel  has  recently  proposed  a  reform  aimed  at  reducing  the  permissible  layers  of 
companies in these structures. However, because the business elites that control pyramidal 
groups strongly oppose any regulation that affects their interests, these reforms need strong 
political support and are very difficult to adopt in a relatively short period of time.  
In order to reduce this Olson problem, I suggest that GIPS’ governments should use 
regulatory dualism to create a new market with enhanced corporate governance rules aimed 
at improving outside investors’ protection and avoiding the adoption of pyramidal ownership 
structures. In particular, I propose that the listing standards of the new market adopt a cap on 
voting not backed by cash flow rights, similar to the one proposed by Lucian Bebchuk in 
Israel. This rule should “require that the holder of any block of 5 percent or more would be 
allowed to cast votes only up to the level backed by the blockholder’s cash flow rights”. 
135 
The  compliance  with  this  provision  should  be  guaranteed  by  an  Audit  Committee, 
composed entirely of independent directors, including one director elected by the minority 
shareholders. The Committee should be required to verify the correspondence between the 
voting rights of any shareholders holding a block of more then 5 percent and his cash flow 
rights. Any disagreement about the decision taken by Audit Committee should be solved in a 
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timely manner before the shareholders meeting by an independent arbitration panel instituted 
and regulated by the listing standard of the new market. 